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INDIAN LAND CLAIMS POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
Russel Lawrence Barsh*
I. INTRODUCTION
From the close of the American Revolution to 1900, the
United States took possession of more than two billion acres of land
claimed by indigenous tribes and nations.' Half of this area was
purchased by treaty or agreement at an average price of less than
seventy-five cents per acre. 2 Another 325,000,000 acres, chiefly in
the Great Basin area, were confiscated unilaterally by Act of
Congress or Executive Order, without compensation. An estimated
350,000,000 acres in the contiguous forty-eight States, and most of
the State of Alaska's 375,000,000 acres, were claimed by the
United States without agreement or the pretense of a unilateral
*A. B., Harvard University, 1971; 1. D., Harvard Law School, 1974; Associate Professor of
Business, Government and Society, University of Washington Graduate School of Business
Administration. Research supported by a contract with the Department of Indian and Northern
Affairs, Canada.
1. Cession areas are computed by areagraph method from maps and legal descriptions in C.
Royce, Indian Land Cessions in the United States, in 2 EiGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY (1899).
2. Id. No precise accounting of payment ever has been made by the United States; many treaties
called for compensation in goods and services, thus making dollar accounting difficult. In 1946
President Truman's staff estimated the total expense of Indian land cessions at $800,000,000 See
Extension of the Indian Claims Commission: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings]. See also
Creation f/Indian Land Claims Commission: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 69 (1945) [hereinafter cited as 1945 Hearings].
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action extinguishing native title. In 1870, at the peak of national
expansionism, 3 American farmland had an average value of more
than fifteen dollars per acre, 4 although the federal government
subsidized new settlement by reselling Indian lands for as little as
twelve and one-half cents per acre. 5 In 1970 the native lands
purchased, confiscated, or otherwise acquired by the United States
had a value of over $560,000,000,000 ($300 per acre) exlusive of
improvements and structures. 6 Even after adjustment for the
changing value of the dollar, this amounted to about ten times what
the tribes were paid a century earlier.
The human cost to tribes of this extraordinary bargain was
great. Tribes generally ceased to be economically self-sufficient.
Their land base shrank during the nineteenth century from as
much as 1,000 acres per capita, to less than 100 acres
per capita, and this shrinkage would have been far greater but
for widespread starvation and disease. 7 The dollar cost to the
United States of shattered tribal economies also was great. From
1900 to 1980, expenditures by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, after
adjustment for inflation, increased tenfold; they currently stand at
more than $1,000,000,000 yearly. 8 The total cost of Indian
administration to the United States, including all federal agencies
and programs, was $3,000,000,000 in the last fiscal year, or as
much as $5,000 per federally served Indian. 9 Indians' per capita
income at the time of the last census was one-fifth of that. 1
0
The events that left the original proprietors of the continent in
possession of less than two percent of the land mass of the United
States have been the subject of criticism and remedial laws since
Reconstruction. The federal response to tribal land grievances has
varied, however, according to fluctuations in public opinion of
Indians' long-term best interests. At first, tribal claims were
submitted to the courts on an individualized basis under special
3. Nearly one-fourth of the contiguous 48 states was acquired from tribes in the single decade
1865-1875; the Russian interest in Alaska was purchased in 1867.
4. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 at 457 (1975)
(computed from Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census) (series K 15).
5. There were also free homestead patents in some cases. B. Hibbard, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC
LAND POLICIES 75-80, 99-100, 103, 113-15 (1924).
6. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 252 (1975) (series 7362-7364).
7. A particularly compelling account of the economics of the early reservation system is
contained in G. HYDE, A SIOUX CHRONICLE (1956).
8. Barsh, The B.LA. Reorganization Follies of 1978: A Lesson in Bureaucratic Self-Defense, 7 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
9. Executive summary was provided by the Office of Management and Budget. Federal
agencies estimate the Indian service population variously between 60,000 and 1,000,000. See W.
.JOHNSTON & S. LEVITAN, INDIAN GIVING: FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS (1975); Taylor,
No Matter How You Count, They all Mean Dollars, Daily OklahomanJune 10, 1980, at 1, 4, col. 1.
10. 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, SUBJECT REPORTS: AMERICAN INDIANS, Table No. 9 (1973)
(compiled by Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census).
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authorizing acts, reflecting regard for the unique and national
character of each tribe. Following the Second World War, public
sentiment demanded termination of tribes' political status, and an
effort was made to settle Indian affairs completely by aggressively
identifying and reviewing every possible remaining claim.
With the resurgence of support for tribal "self-determination"
over the past decade, Congress has returned to individualized
legislation in dealing with newly identified claims in Alaska and the
Eastern seaboard, and intergovernmental negotiation rather than
litigation has been emphasized. One thing has not changed,
however. No significant portion of tribal lands wrongfully taken by
the United States has been returned, and the aggregate
compensation paid to tribes has been far too small to affect tribal
economies appreciably. After a century of land claims legislation
and litigation, American tribes have been paid the equivalent of
less than $2,000 per capita (in 1980 dollars), often in services and
rarely in one lump sum. This is the equivalent of about one dollar
per acre lost or roughly what the United States spends in two years
on the salaries and expenses of federal employees serving Indian
programs and communities. 1
II. THE ERA OF SPECIAL. JURISDICTIONAL ACTS
Indian land claims are scarcely a new problem. In 1878 the
House Committee on Indian Affairs reported that tribes had
pressed more than $6,000,000 in claims for trespass and
property damage by American citizens since the end of the Civil
War. 2 Tribes were unable to prosecute these grievances directly
because they were still classified for many purposes as nations
under treaty, outside of the routine jurisdiction of American courts.
Congress in 1855 established a special Court of Claims to hear
citizens' complaints against the general government,' 3 but in 1863
excluded from its jurisdiction "any claim against the Government
• . . growing out of or dependent on any treaty stipulation entered
into with foreign nations or with Indian tribes.' ' 4 Supposedly, as
long as tribes exercised the power of war and treaties, this proviso,
however inequitable in principle, did not prevent them from
responding to territorial encroachments. In 1870, however, the
11. The Bureau of Indian Affairs alone costs nearly $1,000,000,000 yearly. Less than 20% of
that amount reaches tribes and tribal members as grants or other forms of direct financial assistance.
See Barsh, supra, note 8 at 2-3.
12. H. R. REP. No. 1001,45th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1878).
13. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612.
14. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, §9, 12 Stat. 765, 767.
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United States Supreme Court ruled that an Act of Congress could
supersede the terms of an Indian treaty, 15 and in 1871 Congress cut
off the President's authority to enter into new Indian treaties. 16
Thus, for the first time, tribes were dealt with as if they fell entirely
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. 
17
Deprived for the first time of diplomatic and military recourse
for treaty violations, tribes immediately sought access to the Court
of Claims. A bill to open the Court to tribal plaintiffs was defeated
in 1878,18 but in 1881, Congress approved the first of nearly a
hundred special jurisdictional acts referring the grievances of
individual tribes to the Court of Claims. 19 The language of each act
differed. 20
At first, many special jurisdictional acts directed the Court to
deduct from any award the cost of goods and services
"gratuitously" supplied the tribe by the United States. 21 By
"gratuitously" Congress meant services not specifically required
by treaty. A deficiency appropriations act for the War Department
in 1935 included a rider requiring the Court of Claims in all cases
"to consider and to offset against any amount found due the
tribe or band all sums expended gratuitously by the United States
for [the tribe's] benefit. ",22
This individualized process had many apparent defects. First,
Congress was reluctant to devote the necessary energy and time to
each tribal claimant's case, so that the adjudications of many
meritorious grievances were delayed for years, if not indefinitely.
23
Second, the Department of Justice, charged with defending the
United States before the Court of Claims, vigorously opposed
special jurisdictional bills on the grounds that they cost too much.
24
Third, when tribal claiments succeeded in overcoming
Administration opposition and congressional inertia, they often
found the Court of Claims reluctant to consider their cases
seriously. Fourth, nearly half of all specially authorized tribal
claims were dismissed, interest on awards rarely was paid, and
tribes recovered only about one percent of what they considered
15. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
16. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 3, 16 Stat. 568.
17. See R. BARSH & .J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY ch. 6
(1980).
18. H. R. REP. No. 1001, 45th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1878).
19. Act ofMar. 3, 1881, ch. 139, 21 Stat. 504.
20. See F. Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 374 (1st ed. 1941).
21. Id. See also Indian Claims Comm'n Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Afflairs, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 1946 Hearingsl.
22. Act ofAug. 12, 1935, ch. 508, 52, 49 Stat. 571, 596.
23. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 24, 27-28, 86.
24. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 45-46, 109, 112.
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due to them. (Appendix 1). Finally, most dismissals were not on the
merits, but on the grounds that the claims made lay outside of the
terms of the special jurisdictional bills won from Congress.
25
Consequently, after taking years to obtain authorizing legislation,
most tribes reaching the Court of Claims simply were sent back to
Congress empty-handed. As one congressman would put it a half-
century later, "it seems to me that those tribes who got in under
special jurisdictional acts early on really got taken." ,
26
III. THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION
A. PURPOSE
We know the underlying policy behind the Claims
Commission Act and we are not fooled. The government
intends to clear title to the land illegally taken, to clear
their own conscience before they terminate us. . . .I
wonder where the white man ever got the idea that these
wrongs had to be settled in his courts by his rules.2 7
Dissatisfaction with individualized land claims adjudication
reached national attention in 1940 when both political parties
pledged reform and just settlement of all tribal grievances, 28
perhaps in some part responding to Hitler's well publicized
reference to American Indian policy in justifying the invasions of
Czechoslovakia and Poland.2 9 As the war drew to a close, Congress
purportedly paid tribute to the contributions of Indian soldiers and
sailors by creating a specialized administrative tribunal to hasten
review of tribal claims. The Indian Claims Commission Act would,
Secretary of the Interior .James Krug advised the President,
"strengthen our moral position in the eyes of other minority
peoples" at home and abroad.
30
At congressional hearings on the new claims litigations policy
in 1945, Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Brophy
remarked:
I do not think it is right that any Department should be
25. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 59, 113-14.
26. Indian Claims Comm 'n Act Amendment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian 4ffairs of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Afflairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976) (statement of Washington
Congressman Lloyd Meeds) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearingsl.
27. Id. at 141 (Statement by Frank Fools Crow of the Lakota Treaty Council).
28. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 44, 56, 162; 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 34-35.
29. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 108.
30. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 161-62; 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 50.
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. . .insulated against the past errors by requiring Indian
tribes to come up and get individual .jurisdictional acts. It
takes the time of Congress and the Indians and it costs
money and frequently when the claim gets into court, the
Court of Claims finds that despite the intention of
everybody and the careful draftsmanship that has gone
into the .jurisdictional bill, nevertheless the bill is not
broad enough to cover the particular situation .... It is a
tremendous effort and waste of time. 31
Disposition of claims was now to be complete and final, joining
every conceivable tribal grievance. 32 The Bureau of Indian Affairs
was directed to notify all tribes of the creation of the Indian Claims
Commission, and all claims were to be filed with the Commission
within five years of its establishment. 33 The Senate, over the
opposition of the Justice Department, expressed its understanding
that the Indian Claims Commission Act authorized reopening of
dockets dismissed by the Court of Claims on purely jurisdictional
or procedural grounds. 34 Moreover, in cases in which the Court of
Claims had denied tribal claimants interest on the principal
amount of an award, entitlement to the added interest could be
relitigated before the Commission.
35
To assure completeness and finality, Congress directed the
Commission to hear, in addition to legal and equitable claims,
claims of moral nature based upon the principle of "fair and
honorable dealings. "36 This reflected legislators' conviction that,
"for the most part," tribes would be claiming "additional
compensation . . . for lands sold by them to the Federal
Government in the past at prices considered grossly inequitable in
relation to the value of the land. "3 Thus, it was assumed that the
United States had paid something, however inconsiderable, for
nearly all the acreage acquired from tribes.3 8 Furthermore, tribes'
lawyers were willing to concede that nineteenth century federal
seizures of tribal lands for the private profit of homesteaders, gold
seekers, and ranchers were constitutional exercises of the power of
31. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 14.
32. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 54-55; 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 47.
33. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, §§ 12, 13(a), 60 Stat. 1049, 1052. Some congressmen
questioned the constitutionality of denying meritorious claims bv the use of deadline for filing
actions. See 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 66.
34. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 8, 12. TheJustice Department encouraged Congress to save
the United States' defense of resjudicata. Id. at 18, 24, 26.
35.92 CONG. REC. A4923-24 (1946).
36.25 U.S.C.A. § 70a (West Supp. 1980).
37. S. REP. No. 167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973).
38. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 69-70; Alaska Native Land Claims: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1971).
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eminent domain, implying that tribes had, at best, a right to
compensation.39 Lawyers for the United States argued that
Congress may engage in "fiduciary" transactions in tribal
property without even paying compensation. 40 In spirit, then, the
Indian Claims Commission policy was no admission on the part of
the United States of fundamental injustice or wrongdoing; the
country had, in President Truman's words as he signed the Claims
Commission bill into law, simply made "some mistakes. ",
41
The Department of Justice urged authorizing the Indian
Claims Commission to deduct "gratuitous" federal expenditures
(expenditures not required by treaty) from Indian awards, as the
Court of Claims had done. 42 The Bureau of Indian Affairs,
conversely, argued that public benefits of residence and citizenship
generally are not "gratuities." ' 43 As a compromise, both Houses
recommended limiting the deduction of "gratuities" to the "new
cause of action" created by the Indian Claims Commission Act,
that is, moral claims based upon "fair and honorable dealings."
44
"The cause of action is liberal but, on the other hand," tribal
lawyer Ernest Wilkinson told the Senate, "the offset provision is
liberal. '45 The preconception that tribes had few genuinely
"legal" claims thus resulted in survival of a Court of Claims
practice that had wiped out half of tribes' earlier victories.
National "morality" in no way contemplated tribes' right of
political or cultural self-determination. On the contrary, Congress
and the Administration agreed on settling tribal claims because
they believed it would hasten tribes' assimilation and dispersal. In
1928 a major independent study of Indian policy warned as follows:
The existence of these claims is a serious impediment to
progress. The Indians look forward to getting vast sums
from these claims; thus the facts regarding their economic
future are uncertain. They will hardly knuckle down to
work while they still hope the Government will pay what
they believe is due them.
46
A decade later, a House Select Committee charged with surveying
39. Authorization of Claims: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong., 1 st
Sess. 67 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings; see, eg., United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
40. 1976 Hearings, supra note 26, at 37-38, 40-42. See Barsh, U.S. v. Mitchell Decision Narrows Trust
Responsibility, 6(8) AM. INDIAN L. REV. 2 (1980) (a review of current law on federal trusteeship).
41. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 47.
42. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 25-26.
43. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 21, 60, 63-66.
44. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 22. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 152-56.
45. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 11-12, 19.
46. L. MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADIINISTRATION 19 (1928).
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the nation's Indian affairs agreed that an unsettled tribal claim
"serves to hold the Indian to his life on the reservation through fear
that separation from the tribe might deprive him of his share of a
settlement which he believes the Government may someday
make." 47 Indian Affairs Commissioner Brophy told Congress the
following:
My own personal feeling and the official feeling of the
Department is that if a bill of this sort is passed it will
probably make it possible for large numbers of Indians
who now remain on their tribal rolls and retain their
membership, to surrender that right. They retain
membership now in the expectation that they will get
something in the way of a claim. Once the matter is
settled finally and judicially, I think we shall find the
number of Indians who seek services through a
specialized Bureau will be diminshed.
4 8
Even tribal witnesses assured Congress that unsettled claims were
"killing off the prospects of complete assimilation,' "'49 and one
sponsor of the Claims Commission bill, Oklahoma Congressman
and Choctaw tribal member William Stigler, called upon the
Government "to wind up the affairs of some of the tribes that
should have been wound up years ago. "50
Secretary of the Interior Krug urged presidential support of
the Commission bill. He explained:
The efforts of the Government to make of the Indian a
self-supporting and fully assimilated segment of our
civilization can never hope for complete success so long as
a considerable number of Indian tribes follow the very
human and natural inclination to sit back and wait for the
day of payment of the claims which will bring them
riches. Adjudication of those claims by the Commission
.. .would once and for all cause the Indians to realize
that their further progress will depend upon their own
efforts, for the claims which the Indians assert are in
nearly all cases grossly exaggerated in size and in many
cases wholly without merit. 5t
47. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 49.
48. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 15.
49. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 26-27 (statement of Ben Dwight, Choctaw Attorney).
50. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 7.
51. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 48.
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The cost of settling Indian claims did not concern the
Government; it was assumed that most tribal claims would be
dismissed, as they had been under special jurisdictional acts, and
that the tribes would have no choice but to be content with that
result. Indeed, one attorney active in the earlier tribal litigation,
when advocating the Commission bill, estimated that all
unresolved claims would, after offsets, yield tribes not more than
$25,000,000.52 Even this modest cost of final assimilation actually
would fall on the tribes themselves. Secretary Krug consoled.
Bureau of the Budget DirectorJames Webb:
Even those claims which do ripen into money awards will
not represent any long-term cost to the Government
[since] appropriations for the welfare of Indians have long
been made, first from the Indians' own funds, to the
extent that they have funds on deposit in the Treasury,
and then from general Treasury funds.
53
Settlement also would spur many tribes to be economically
self-sustaining. In other words, the Government believed claims
settlement payments would be small, and would be used to pay for,
or eliminate the need for, reservation programs otherwise paid out
of federal funds.
Nevertheless, there were those in Congress who feared the cost
of settlement and assimilation would be higher than the country
reasonably could afford. They felt Congress should review each
Indian Claims Commission award carefully before appropriating
funds to pay it.
It must be remembered that this legislation will not mean
very much, even after it is enacted and the Commission
set up, if they come back with preposterous claims to the
Congress in asking for money. Why, the Commission
will soon be out of existence. It has to stand the test of
reason and common sense, and, regardless of what we put
in this legislation, it will not mean much unless the
Commission uses good sound discretion in disposing of
these claims. 54
52. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 106, 108.
53. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 48.
54. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 154 (statement by Washington SenatorJackson). At least one
Administration witness, Justice Department attorney Frank Chambers, worried also about the
possibility that the Commission would alienate tribes by not being generous enough. "If this
Commission does not have very careful supervision from Congress it is going to bog down and it is
going to be a failure .... If it turns down all of these claims it is going to be a failure." 1946 Hearings,
supra note 21, at 63. See also 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 41, 48-49, 62-63, 74-75, 81.
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Although Congress and the Administration were less than
unanimous on the advisibility of case-by-case congressional review
and supervision, the message to the Indian Claims Commission
appeared plain: be thorough, but protect the national purse.
B. PERFORMANCE
In several significant areas, the Indian Claims Commission
failed to meet the expectations either of tribes or of Congress. Most
obvious was its failure to complete its work in ten years, as
Congress originally had intended. Although Administration
spokesmen were confident in 1946 that ten years would be
adequate, 55 the Commission had finally disposed of only a little
more than half of its caseload twenty-five years later. 56 "You won't
get it done in 100 years," Oklahoma Senator Burdick complained
to Commission Chairman Kuykendall in 1971, "Do you have any
idea how many Indians have died in those 25 years, and will never
see any money?' 
5 7
Commission staff identified three main sources of delay. First,
even with its eighteen staff attornies, the .Justice Department's
Indian Claims unit found itself overwhelmed with the task of
defending the United States; in one eighteen-month period,
government defense lawyers requested 6,451 days of delays.58
Second, staff shortages also limited the General Accounting
Office's ability to provide the Commission audits of tribal funds
and property held by the United States. 59 Finally, complicating the
sheer volume of work involved in reconstructing transactions
stretching back a century or more was the "chaotic" state of
Bureau of Indian Affairs records reported by other contemporary
investigators.
60
The Commission also faulted tribes' lawyers, in part, for trial
55. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 39, 121-31.
56. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1.
57. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 12-13, 43.
58. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 4, 40 (personal communication by Richard Beale, Dep't of
Justice).
59. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 6. In 1971 the General Accounting Office had only a handful
of accountants assigned to tribal claims. Id. Shortly thereafter, tribal claims accounting was
transferred to the General Services Administration with a personnel ceiling of 130 positions, but as
late as 1977 only 75 of those positions were filled. Indian Claims Comm'n Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 74, 77-78 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Appropriations Hearingsj; Indian Claims
Comm'n Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6-7, 20, 22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Appropriations Hearings]. The General Service Administration estimated that each tribal claims
audit required 20 to 24 man-years to complete, suggesting the scale of the problem. 1976
Appropriation Hearings, supra, at 77.
60. Statute of Limitations Extension: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 95, 126-27, 180-81, 183 (1979).
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delays, but recognized that tribes' ability to promptly prosecute
complex cases had been limited by lack of funds for expert
witnesses.
61
Commission Chairman Kuykendall told Congress in 1975 that
completing the Commission's caseload by 1980 "would require
strong and sincere efforts on the part of the lawyers to settle
cases. "62 Countering Congressional criticism, Kuykendall argued,
"[Ilt is not a case of our trying to lengthen or create more work. We
realize we have all the work we can handle and perhaps more. It is
simply a case of trying to do justice. "63 After repeated extensions,
the Commission was permitted to expire in 1978, and its remaining
caseload was transferred to the Court of Claims.
64
Notwithstanding thirty-two years of litigation, the
Commission failed to achieve Congress's goal of a thorough and
final settlement of tribal grievances. In at least one instance, a tribe
was not notified of the Commission's establishment early enough to
file its claims within the five-year statutory deadline. 65 Congress in
1980 enacted a special jurisdictional bill to refer this case to the
Court of Claims. 6 The Sioux and as many as six other tribes whose
pre-1946 petitions were dismissed by the Court of Claims on
procedural or technical grounds tried unsuccessfully to relitigate
their cases under the Indian Claims Commission Act. Despite
Congress's apparent desire that such cases be reopened, the
Commission dismissed all of them as res judicata. 67 The Wichita
tribe's pre-1946 case also was dismissed on technical grounds by
the Court of Claims, but lawyers were so certain that refiling under
the Indian Claims Commission Act was pointless, none would
represent the tribe. 68 Ironically, the Wichitas' lawyers relied on
consultation with one of the Interior Department officials who had
testified in favor of the Commission in 1946.
While admitting that as many as twenty tribes in all had
similar experiences, the Justice Department has vigorously opposed
legislation to reopen individual cases. 69 "The administration
61. 1976 Appropriation Hearings, supra note 59, at 7, 74.
62. 1976 Appropriation Hearings, supra note 59, at 77.
63. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 41.
64. Indian Claims Comm'n Annual Rep. (1978). When the Commission expired it transferred
nearly 100 unresolved dockets to the Court of Claims as provided by Pub. L. No. 94-465, § 2, 90
Stat. 1990 (1976) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 70 v (West 1976 & Supp. 1980)).
65. S. REP. No. 397, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979).
66. Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-251, 94 Stat. 372.
67. H.R. REP. No. 529, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1977); see, e.g., 1976 Hearings, supra Note 26,
at 7-9, 38-39, 59-60.
68. H. R. REP. No. 597, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1977); see, e.g., 1976 Hearings, supra note 26,
at 122-32.
69. H. R. REP. No. 597, supra, note 68, at 6-7, 14; S. REP. No. 397, supra note 65, at 6; 1979
Hearings, supra note 39, at 36; 1976 Hearings, supra note 26, at 10-11.
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recognizes the significance which native Americans place on efforts
to correct past injustices to them and to their ancestors," Assistant
Attorney General Patricia Wald advised Congress in 1977, and
"believes that the United States must address these past injustices
with an emphasis on compassion for the victims of injustice rather
than on technical interpretations of the law. "70 The Carter
government promised a "comprehensive" federal policy on
"unresolved Indian claims," but in the meantime opposed as a
dangerous precedent legislative action on any particular case. If
tribes like the Sioux were permitted to refile, Donald Mileur of the
Justice Department's Indian Claims unit told Congress in 1976,
"you would have as many claims as you had to begin with and
maybe more. '"71 This indirect hint that the work of the
Commission had done little to satisfy tribes' longstanding
grievances did not prevent Congress from authorizing renewal of
the Sioux claim in 1978.72
Many tribes that were more successful in winning money
judgments from the Commission than the Sioux or Wichita proved
just as disappointed. The Commission's measure of damages in
most claims was the market value of the land at the time of taking,
without interest or adjustment for inflation. One 1860 dollar had
the buying power of about fifteen 1980 dollars - leading some
representatives of the Cowlitz tribe to demand payment of their
claim judgment in gold and silver coins of the year their land was
lost. 73 Moreover, one 1860 dollar, with interest, would have earned
about sixty-four dollars by 1980, causing many tribes, generally
without success, to demand the payment of interest on their claims
judgments. Lastly, it is noteworthy that the market value of tribal
lands at the time of nineteenth-century transactions often had to be
guessed at or based on the federal resale rate of a dollar or two per
acre, because prior to the treaty or taking in issue, no land in the
area had been bought or sold privately. 74 Consequently,
Commission awards frequently represented less than one percent of
the real value of the damages suffered by tribal claimants.
Interest was not paid on any claims against the United States
until 1925, and not ordinarily on any tribal claims against the
United States until 1935.1 5 Thereafter, the Court of Claims
70. H. R. REP. No. 597, supra note 68, at 7; see, e.g., H. R. REP. 529, supra note 67, at 11.
71. 1976 Hearings, supra note 26, at 36.
72. Pub. L. No. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978).
73. H. R. REP, No. 1497, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
74. For an exhaustive citation of Commission rulings on the issues of valuation and measure of
damages, see INDEX TO THE DECISIONS OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION (1973).
75. 1979 Hearings, supra note 39, at 12-13, 17-20. The rule of including interest from the time of
the loss or taking in judgments against the United States was established in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
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adopted the rule, observed also by the Indian Claims Commission,
"that interest is not allowed unless title to the land has already been
recognized by the United States. Further, the land must have been
taken without the tribe's consent, and the taking must have been
ratified by Congress. "76 When those criteria were met, the taking
was deemed to have been made in accordance with the fifth
amendment, hence subject to the requirement of "just
compensation" with interest. Federal confiscation of
'unrecognized" or "aboriginal" lands (lands immemorially
occupied by a tribe but never reserved expressly for the tribe's use
by treaty) was deemed to raise at best a "moral" right to
restitution, without interest.77 These distinctions worked two
inequities, from tribes' point of view. Several tribes won judgments
in the Court of Claims before that court began to allow tribes
interest on takings of "recognized" title, then were barred from
seeking the added interest before the Indian Claims Commission.78
Other tribes lost out on interest merely because their ancient
landholdings had never been mentioned in federal laws or treaties.
Tribes also found fault with the Commission's handling of
"gratuitous" offsets. The United States often sought to count as
"gratuities" services paid for with the tribal claimant's own funds,
and in at least one instance succeeded.7 9 The United States also
sought to deduct the cost of grants and contracts awarded to tribes
under recent laws such as the Indian Self-Determination Act of
1975, which were intended to strengthen tribal self-government. 80
Commission offsets policy offers no discernable pattern; as one
senator predicted in 1946, "Standards in this thing will change
from time to time as the personalities change on the
Commission." ' 8i It does appear, however, that the Commission
was significantly less inclined to allow the deduction of "gratuties"
than the Court of Claims had been. The Commission made
United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923). However, the Court of Claims continued to deny interest in
most tribal land claims cases. See, e.g., Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 23 (1935); Creek
Nation v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 159 (1933); Fort Berthold Indians v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl.
308, 309 (1930). However, the Court of Claims has recognized such an interest in tribal land claims
cases when expressly directed to do so by the Supreme Court. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States,
299 U.S. 476 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
76. 1979 Hearin.gs, supra note 39, at 1.
77. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955).
78. Those tribes viewed Pub. L. No. 95-243, supra note 72, which reopened the Sioux Black
Hills claim, as precedent for renewal of other tribal claims barred by technical defenses. See, e.g.,
1979 Hearings, supra note 39, at 14, 22-24, 88-89. Montana Senator Melcher stated: "Personally. I
have no sympathy at all for not allowing the interest [on tribal judgments]. That is beyond me." Id.
at 99-100.
79. 1979 Hearin.gs, supra note 39, at 56, 60-61, 73-75.
80. 1979 Hearings, supra note 39, at 99. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975).
81. 1946 Hearings, supra note 21, at 67.
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findings as to offsets in thirty-seven dockets. It also approved
settlements of 149 dockets that involved offsets issues, of which
thirty-seven specified the amount of offsets agreed to by the parties.
All together, liquidated offsets in these dockets amounted to only
$9.6 million, or less than two percent of all awards. 
8 2
C. EFFECT OF PAYMENT
Often a single federally recognized tribal organization or
incorporated descendancy association filed claims on behalf of a
much larger ancestral group. Sometimes other descendant tribes
and organizations opposed the choice of strategy or of attorneys, or
objected generally to seeking money damages instead of land. The
history of the Seminole claim is illustrative, 83 The claim was filed
by several reservation Seminole employees of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs at the Bureau's suggestion. The group of "traditional" or
"unsurrendered" Seminoles refused to recognize this lawsuit and
repeatedly sought to quash it or disassociate themselves from it.
That group sought instead to negotiate terms with the United
States for land around their existing settlements. Although
President Eisenhower agreed to negotiate with the "traditional"
band, the Commission and Court of Claims refused even to permit
i.t to intervene in the pending claim litigation. When a judgment for
the "Seminole Nation" was rendered, the United States broke off
talks with the "traditionals," arguing that the judgment had paid
and thus extinguished all Seminole land rights.
In the words of "traditional" Seminole attorney Robert
Coulter, "forc[ing] payment on them - over their documented,
clear objection . . . to extinguish their historic property rights,
including their rights to their present homes and villages," was
"shocking." 8 4 TheJustice Department took the position, however,
that individual descendant tribes and bands have no constitutional
due process rights to participate individually in claims litigation,
even when their existence, and their diversity of interests, is known
to the United States. 85 According to the Department, the
Commission, simply by including a descendant group in a
judgment, with or without its consent, settled all of that group's
outstanding claims against the Government.
86
82. 1975 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 59, at 17-18.
83. Distribution of Seminole Judgment Funds: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-127 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearingsl. See also Six Nat'l Confederacy
v. Andrus, 447 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1977) affid, 610 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
84 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 64.
85. 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 125-27.
86. 1978 Hearins, supra note 83, at 58.
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The Seminole litigation is not unique in this regard. The
Oglala Sioux Tribe withdrew from claims involving eight Sioux
tribes and bands in 1977, allowing its attorney contract to expire
and advising the United States by tribal council resolution that it
would seek repossession of land it alleged had been confiscated
unconstitutionally. 87 The original claim went to.judgment, and the
United States now contends that this extinguishes the rights of the
"Sioux Indian Nation" as a whole, although the relevant treaties
and agreements upon which the claim was based were signed with
each Sioux tribe and band individually. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of an action by the Oglala
Sioux Tribe attempting to quiet title to the land in controversy.88
The Seminole and Oglala Sioux cases suggest a broader
problem and one that will come back to haunt the Congress. The
fifth amendment provides that Congress may exercise the power
of eminent domain only for a "public purpose; '"89 only when this
power is exercised constitutionally is compensation an issue. If a
federal taking is not only uncompensated, but substantively
unlawful because it is made for a private purpose, it presumably is
void ab initio and the dispossessed landowner may seek to quiet title.
However, Congress in fashioning the Indian Claims Commission
Act, assumed that most tribes had been paid some consideration for
their lands and did not anticipate any legitimate suits for the land
itself.
Limiting Indian Claims Commission claims to money
damages invited tribes to waive the allegation of substantive
unconstitutionality, admit that takings were lawful when made,
and seek "just compensation" only. As a matter of constitutional
law, however, it is questionable whether Congress can cure an ultra
vires act by offering to pay damages, but refusing to reverse the
unlawful act itself. Non-tribal cases generally have held that
Congress cannot limit the "just compensation" due to a
condemnee; the measure of compensation is left to the courts. 90 If
Congress cannot take land worth $1,000 for a public purpose and
legislatively direct the courts to award the condemnee no more than
87. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, U.S.L.W.
Jan. 18, 1982; Seealso United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222 (9thCir. 1978).
88. 650 F.2d at 144.
89. See, e.e., Block v. Hirsch. 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S.
666 (1873); Mills v. Saint Clair Co., 49 U.S. 569 (a taking must be in the exercise of some article I
power, and not for private profit).
90. E.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 581 (1933); Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312, 327 (1893).
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$100 as compensation, Congress certainly should not be able to
take land worth $1,000 for a private purpose, unconstitutionally,
and then direct the courts to consider only a claim by the
condemnee for money. As tribes become aware of the extent to
which the Indian Claims Commission Act actually limited their
rights, the Act's finality will come under increasing challenge and
may fail.
D. COSTS AND BENEFITS
Appendix 3 compares Indian Claims Commission awards with
the cost of the Indian claims litigation process. Tribal claimants
manifestly were more successful in the Commission than in
previous litigation before the Court of Claims, winning more than
twenty times as many dollars, although 200 of 484 dockets were
dismissed. 91 On the other hand, the Commission was costly both to
tribes and to the Government, since the adversary proceedings
required the participation of scores of lawyers, judges, accountants,
and clerks for more than three decades. Overall, the Commission
awarded tribes roughly the amount of money the Bureau of Indian
Affairs spends in a single fiscal year, at an efficiency of about
sixteen percent - sixteen cents cost for every dollar received by
tribes.
Lawyers' fees have remained a sensitive issue since the first
consideration of comprehensive claims adjudication in 1946.
Although some law firms representing tribes argued that there
would be little incentive to pursue claims without a contingency fee
of up to fifteen percent of the judgment, 92 others assured Congress
that a ten percent ceiling would be adequate, and that the
Commission would never seriously consider approving even that
much on a multimillion dollar award. 93 Nevertheless, tribal
attorney fees have averaged 9.86 percent of the Commission's
awards, and represent the largest single cost of the Indian Claims
Commission process. In addition to attorneys' fees, 94 other
expenses were deducted from the award, including attorney
expenses, expert witness fees and expenses, planning costs
incidental to distribution of the award, and frequently, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs' cost of preparing updated tribal membership rolls
91. Indian Claims Comm'n Annual Rep. app. I & 2 (1978).
92. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 91.
93. 1946 Hearin4gs, supra note 21, at 36. See 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 38.
94. Counsel for the Navajo Tribe unsuccessfully urged Congress to provide for payment of fees
at the expense of the United States, rather than by deduction from tribes' award. 1945 Hearings, supra
note 2, at 12-13.
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for determination of beneficiaries. 95 Approximately 11.25 percent
of the tribe's recovery, then, was paid to counsel and to the United
States prior to distribution.
The Commission and Justice Department employed 1200
man-years of lawyers' time, and tribal claimants probably utilized
as much or more legal assistance for the $70,000,000 they
paid in legal fees. Arizona Congressman Murdock may have been
justifiably cynical in commenting, in 1945, that "the impression
has been on the minds of many Members of Congress, and even
myself, that probably one of the chief motives [behind the
Commission] was the lawyers' fees." ' 96 Requiring tribes to
prosecute, and the United States to defend these claims in a judicial
forum also significantly delayed payment. After thirty years of
continuous litigation, tribal claimants had won the equivalent of
about 1,000,000,000 1978 dollars at a cost of more than
1,200,000,000 1978 dollars to the United States. Thus, tribes
would have been as well off financially had the United States simply
transferred $150,000,000 to their trust accounts in 1946, and
allowed them to reap thirty years' intervening interest.
E. DISTRIBUTION PROCESS
At first, the Bureau of Indian Affairs distributed Indian
Claims Commission awards without specific authority from
Congress. 9 7  Once funds to satisfy the award had been
appropriated, they were transferred administratively to the tribe's
trust account where, while accumulating interest under Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) management, 98 they remained available for
purposes agreed on by the Bureau and the tribe. No accounting
was made to Congress. Beginning in 1960, however, Congress
asserted direct control over the distribution of awards by inserting,
in each year's Interior Department appropriations act, a proviso
prohibiting "expenditure of funds derived from appropriations in
satisfaction of awards of the Indian Claims Commission or the
95. Exceptions were made for some tribes, including several small Washington tribes, S. REP.
No. 1144, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); and for the Yankton Sioux Tribe, H. R. REP. No. 639, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971). See infra appendix 3 to this article for more information. In 1978 the
Bureau of Indian Aflairs asked to have all enrollment costs borne by tribal claimants, but Congress
declined to resolve the issue. Indian.]udgment Funds Use or Distribution Plans: Hearings Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979.]udgment Funds
Hearing 1.
96. 1945 Hearings, supra note 2, at 84.
97. H. R. REP. No. 1304, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1047 [hereinafter cited as H. R. REP. No. 13041; H. R. REP. No. 417, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1979).
98. 25 U.S.C.A. S 161, 161a, 162a (West 1963) (general authority for Interior Department to
arrange and invest tribal funds).
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Court of Claims ... until after legislation has been enacted that sets
forth the purposes for which said funds will be used. "99 In practice
this meant that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in consultation with
affected tribes, developed a budget for expenditure of the award,
then sought legislative authorization to carry it out. Research
reports on tribes' socioeconomic condition were submitted to
Congress routinely in support of each proposed plan. 100
Congress quickly tired of this process and, in the 1973
Distribution of Judgment Funds Act, redelegated most of the
responsibility for plan review to the Department of the Interior. 10 1
Now, once funds to satisfy an award have been appropriated, the
Department and its Bureau of Indain Affairs have six months to
hold public hearings and submit a distribution plan to Congress. If
within sixty days neither House resolves to reject the plan, it
becomes effective without further legislative or administrative
action. Tribes' wishes are to be considered, but are not controlling
in the formulation of distribution plans to "best serve the interests
of all those entities and individuals entitled" to share in the
*judgment.102 "I believe our responsibility goes considerably
beyond the mere providing of funds," explained New Mexico
Representative Lujan. "I think it extends into the area of making
certain that the funds are used to the best advantage of the
tribe. "103
The Distribution Act grew chiefly out of the complaint of the
Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and its
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs that judgment distribution
legislation had grown to half of its workload. This "undue
burden . . . limits the committee's capacity to address its energies




99. H. R. REP. No. 1304, supra note 97, at 2.
100. See S. REP. No. 1383, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 141, 92d Cong., I st Sess.
(1971); S. REP. No. 973, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. REP. No. 976, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972);
H. R. REP. No. 697, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); H. R. REP. No. 962, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972);
S. REP. No. 393, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. REP. No. 409, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R.
REP. No. 147, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. REP. No. 147, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R.
REP. No. 696, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. REP. No. 148, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R.
REP. No. 151, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. REP. No. 1128, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H. R.
REP. No. 1373, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. REP. No. 27, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971); H. R.
REP. No. 637, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); H. R. REP. No. 639, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.
REP. No. 969, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. REP. No. 144, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. REP.
No. 851, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 848, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H. R. REP. No.
1439, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H. R. REP. No. 1350, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H. R. REP.
No. 1348, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H. R. REP. No. 1423, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
101. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1407 (West Supp. 1980).
102. Id. §5 1403(a), 1404 (2).
103. 1979Judgment Funds Hearing, supra note 95, at 13.
104. Indian.Judgment Funds Distribution Act of 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., I st Sess. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Indianjudgment Funds Hearing]. See also S. REP. No. 167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1973
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Administrative control would reduce delays in the final payment of
awards, the committee hoped, and bring the claims settlement
process as a whole to a speedier conclusion.10 5 "I have to think back
to the frustrations of Congress, which go back to 1946, during the
long period of time when claims could be submitted," Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs Chairman John Melcher remarked
during 1979 hearings on judgment distribution, "The more recent
judgment of a lot of the people involved on these committees is that
they want to get it over with. "o106
For its part, the Interior Department was anxious to regain
principal responsibility for plan development. It even opposed the
Distribution Act's provision for veto of a plan by the resolution of
either House of Congress, suggesting instead that only an act
approved by both Houses block plan implementation.107 The
Department also resisted the imposition of a time limit on its
formulation of tribe's distribution plans, agreeing reluctantly to
Senate Subcommittee Chairman.James Abourezk's proposal that,
when.justified, time extensions be granted by Congress. 1 08 "We are
certain that the time limitation can be met, except in a few most
difficult cases, where we will not be able to reach agreement with
the recipients," Assistant Secretary of the Interior John Kyl
concluded. 109
Although in adopting the Distribution of Judgment Funds
Act, Congress promised to exercise direct legislative supervision of
"the most complicated" cases,110  it carefully has avoided
interfering with administrative decisions. Only three judgment
distribution plans have been subjected to congressional scrutiny
since 1973. In one case the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs
felt that "the Department had not sufficiently taken into
consideration the needs and desires of the affected Indian
groups." 1  The other two plans already had been enjoined by
U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEws 2311 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 23111. In the 92nd Congress
alone, judgment distribution measures comprised 21 out of the Senate committee's 41 enacted bills
and took up 11 of its 23 days of hearings. Id.
105. 1973 Indian./udgment Funds Hearing, supra note 103, at 12; S. REP. No. 93-167, supra note
103, at 2.
106. See 1979.Judnent Funds Hearing, supra note 94, at 40.
107. The Department considered the plan for veto by resolution of either House a violation of
the principle of separation of powers. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 104, at 4; 1973 Indian.Judgment
Funds Hearing, supra note 104, at 13-14, 22-24, 28, 32. Ironically, the idea of submitting plans for
congressional committees' review originated with the Interior Department itself, and in two out of
three cases that that Department suggested it, Congress declined. S. REp. No. 27, supra note 100, at
2; H. R. REP. No. 151, supra note 100, at 1-2; H. R. REP. No. 1078, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
108. 1973 Indian.Judgment Funds Hearing, supra note 104, at 21-22. Tribes asked that extensions be
granted only with the consent of the Indians affected. Id. at 34-35.
109. S. REP. No. 93-467, supra note 104, at 7; See also 1973 Indian.udgment Funds Hearing, supra
note 104, at 16, 21.
110. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 104, at 1.
11!. H. R. REP. No. 1423, supra note 100, at 7.
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federal courts on the petitions of dissatisfied tribal groups.1 12 As of
1979, moreover, fifty-nine out of sixty-two plans submitted to
Congress by the Department had been submitted late, but not one
had been disapproved. 
1 1 3
The Bureau of Indian Affairs implicitly blamed tribes
themselves for persistent delays in plan development. "We have
been very consistent with the spirit of the law, and the policy of
Indian Self-Determination, in not holding a Hearing of Record
until a suitable tribal proposal has been submitted and
reviewed. "114 In practical terms this often has meant delays of
years while the tribe makes distribution proposals and the Bureau
rejects them.1 1 5 It would have been more consistent, both with the
policy of self-determination and speedy payment of claims, for the
Bureau in cases of disagreement to adopt the tribe's position, or at
least transmit its own plan and the tribe's to Congress as
alternatives.
Congress, however, appears more concerned with completing
the settlement process than assuring that tribes have a key role in
plan development. In 1979 a Florida district court enjoined
implementation of the Seminole Nation plan, in part because it had
been submitted late to Congress.1 1 6 Alleging an emergency, the
Interior Department proposed legislation to validate retroactively
to 1974 all late-submitted plans, and asked that in the future it be
permitted to grant itself extensions of time without congressional
approval.' Over tribal objections and with little tribal
participation, validation legislation was rushed through both
Houses early in 1980.118 To counter colleagues' objections to his
haste, House cosponsor Morris Udall argued on the floor, "this is a
very simple little Indian bill . . . ,' implying that it did not merit
debate. 119
On the contrary, hearings on the validation proposal revealed
that one-fourth of all plans submitted late to Congress since 1973
112. 1978 Hearings, supra note 83; Delaware Indian. udgment Funds: Hearing Before the Senate Select
Comm. on IndianAffairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearingsl.
113. 1979.1udment Funds Hearing, supra note 95, at 1-2, 6, 16.
114. 1979,fudgment Funds Hearing, supra note 95, at 6.
115. Letter from Theodore C. Krenzke, Acting Deputy Comm'r of Indian Affairs, to Senator
John Melcher, Chairman of the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, (April 11, 1980). Krenzke
has represented the Klallam tribes.
116. Seminole Indian Tribe v. Andrus, No. 78-994, Slip op. at _ (D. Fla. 1979). See also Gold
v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, 478 F. Supp. 190 (D. Or. 1979).
117. See H. R. REP. No. 96-417, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also 1979.Judgment Funds
Hearing, supra note 95, at 9, 37.
118. See Pub. L. No. 96-194, 94 Stat. 61 (1980). Bills introduced earlier to validate individual
late distribution plans were Pub, L. No. 96-319, 94 Stat. 972 (1980); Pub. L. No. 94-540, 90 Stat.
2503 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-189, 89 Stat. 1093 (1975).
119. 126 CONG. REC. H536 (1980).
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had substantial, unresolved problems. 120 Seven of the tribes refused
to participate in plan development or to accept the award because
they considered it inadequate, or insisted upon repossession of the
land at issue. Two tribes could not agree with the Bureau on
distribution and objected to the plans as submitted. Five tribes
disagreed with the Bureau's conclusions about division of the
award among several descendancy groups, and objected to the
plans on that basis. Criticizing validation legislation, Seminole
tribal attorney Robert Coulter told the following to the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs:
Now the Department comes here asking that Congress
change its mind and condone now what was expressly
forbidden by the [Distribution of.Judgment Funds] Act.
There are surely constitutional limits on the power of
Congress to validate illegal acts where substantial rights
are at stake. At least this should not be done without
hearing Indian views. 
121
F. How THE MONEY WAS DIVIDED
In its development of distribution plans, both before and after
the Distribution of .Judgment Funds Act, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs made two kinds of decisions. When several descendancy
groups arguably were entitled to share in an award, the Bureau
determined their actual eligibility and respective proportions of a
division. Only after a division had been established could proposals
for the use of funds be considered. The Bureau vigorously defended
this quasi-judicial role, although it arose originally simply by
default. Assistant Secretary.John Kyl wrote Congress in 1973:
The burden of identifying beneficiaries has fallen on the
Secretary of the Interior, a process we feel should
continue to be followed because of the fact that the
identity of beneficiaries often demands intense research in
the cultural and political history of the involved group or
groups. This is a task that neither the Indian Claims
Commission nor the Court of Claims is equipped to
handle. 122
120. 1979.udgment Funds Hearing, supra nete 94, at 30-31.
121. 1979.Judgmeni Funds Hearing, supra note 95, at 35-36.
122. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 104, at 5. See also 1973,Judrment Funds Hearing, supra note 104, at
14, 19.
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Kyl did not attempt to explain why this task was more complex
than determining which tribes had lived where and how much, if
anything, they had been paid for their lands, a task the
Commission had already discharged.
At least one federal court has sustained the Bureau's authority
to determine divisions free from judicial review, 123 although the
conventional rule has been that administrative decisions involving
Indian affairs are no less vulnerable to judicial reconsideration than
other agency actions.' 2 4 The courts and Congress have, however,
given the Bureau some indirect, admittedly confusing, guidance.
"These are judgments to rectify earlier wrongs, based on who was
wronged and where they are now," Senate Select Committee
Chairman Melcher explained. 125 According to the Court of Claims,
though, "a claim under the Indian Claims Commission Act is not
an aggregation of individual claims but a group claim on behalf of a
tribe, band, or other identifiable group. ", 126 This flows reasonably
from the rule that "tribal lands are communal property in which
the members have no separate interest which can pass to their
descendants who are no longer members of that group.' 1 27 It
would appear, then, that awards should be apportioned among
contemporary tribal entities as successors in interest of past entities.
Tribes complain, however, that "the Bureau of Indian Affairs deals
with that money as if they were dealing with an estate and passing it
out to heirs.' ' 28 A careful review of BIA practice suggests that
analysis is correct.
The simplest division problem involves a single ancestral tribe
broken up among several reservations, and reconstituted as two or
more modern tribal governments. The Bureau's statement that
division in such cases is made on the basis of population 129 conceals
a multitude of sins. Some divisions were arranged by agreement of
123. Seminole Indian Tribe v. Andrus, No. 78-994 Slip. op. at -_ (D. Fla. 1979).
124. Dull Knife v. Morton, 394 F. Supp. 1299 (D.S.D. 1975). See Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397
U.S. 598 (1970). Before Tooahnippah, federal courts often regarded these administrative decisions as
non-reviewable. See, e.g., Prairie Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364, 367 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966); Prairie Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Pucklee, 321 F.2d
767, 770 (10th Cir. 1963). The constitutionality of Indian administration, as opposed to the
reasonableness of exercises of administrative discretion, always has been reviewable. See Delaware
Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977); Simmons v. Eagle
Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808 (E. D. Wash. 1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966).
125. 1980 Heartngs, supra note 112, at 157. See Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 281
F.2d 202 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Prairie Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 139
(Ct. Cl. 1958). Seealso Eastern Band ofCherokee Indians v. United States, 117 U.S. 288 (1886).
126. 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 467.
127. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 906 (Ct. Cl. 1963), quoted in 1980
Hearings, supra note 112, at 144.
128. 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 37.
129. 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 57.
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the tribes involved, often after "prolonged controversy." 13 0 Others
were based on current enrollment, 3 ' but wherever the Bureau
believed that differences among tribes' enrollment criteria would
result in an "inequitable" division, proportions were based upon
old rolls, some as old as the 1880'S.132 Often there was no apparent
basis, other than political, for the Bureau's choice of one of a
number of historical rolls for division purposes. 
133
More difficult cases involved breakaway bands that left the
main body of a tribe after the event upon which the claim was
based. For example, when the Delawares agreed by treaty to
emigrate to the Indian Territory, they were individually offered the
option of taking fee patents, accepting citizenship, and remaining
east of the Mississippi. Each fee-patent Delaware was paid his share
of tribal funds then on deposit with the United States. When the
Delawares won a.judgment for pre-emigration claims, the western
group vigorously opposed including the eastern, fee-patent group
in the distribution, arguing that they had severed their tribal
relations. 134 Eventually three other breakaway groups surfaced as a
result of BIA research, includingone in Idaho that traced its
descent from a single Delaware household that had left the tribe a
century earlier. 13 5 Litigation forced the issue into Congress.
The Seminole case involved similar issues. Following the
Seminole Wars, most of the tribe was removed to the Indian
Territory, where it established a reservation and government and
enjoyed federal recognition and services until federal supervision
was terminated 'a century and a half later. Some Seminoles
remained in Florida, however, living as an unrecognized and
unserved group until, in the 1950's, their tribal status was
acknowledged by the Interior Department. When a claim in the
name of the "Seminole Nation" was to be divided, the eastern
Seminoles argued that they were more deserving because they had
lost out on a century of federal services and had no reservation
land. Conversely, the western group argued that they were more
deserving because they had suffered involuntary removal and
termination. 136
In a few cases a small tribe was absorbed by another, or
130. See S. REP. No. 976, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971); H. R. REP. No. 1078, supra note 107,
at 2-3; S. REP. No. 27, supra note 100, at 2.
131. See H. R. REP. No. 151, supra note 100, at 1-2.
132. S. REP. No. 141, supra note 100, at 1-3; S. REP. No. 848, supra note 100, at 2-3. See 1978
Hearing, supra note 83, at 37, 47.
133. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 57. In at least one instance, the division between two
tribes was formulated on the basis ofthe relative acreage of their reservations. Id.
134. 1980 Hearings, supra note 112, at 90-91.
135. 1980 Hearings, supra note 112, at 90-91.
136. 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 17-23, 27-29, 35.
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combined with other tribes to form a modern reservation
community. No consistent rule of division has applied in these
situations. For example, the Lemhi tribe became a minority group
within the Shoshone-Bannock tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation,
and the Lemhi claim judgment was awarded to Fort Hall to expend
for general reservation purposes.' 37 However, the Bureau opposed
allowing the Tulalip tribal government to spend the Snohomish
judgment (although the majority of Tulalip reservation residents
are of Snohomish descent), insisting instead on distributing the
fund per capita to Snohomish descendants. 11
8
Frequently, some of the descendants of a claimant tribe are
enrolled in modern tribes, and others are scattered among non-
reservation communities. Sometimes the Bureau has insisted on
including all descendants in these circumstances, regardless of
whether they are members of reservation tribes. "It has been the
Bureau of Indian Affairs' policy to recommend the inclusion of a
descendancy group in the distribution of judgment funds if that
group includes significant numbers of identifiable, known
descendants who are not members of other identifiable tribes or
groups. ,139 To implement this policy old rolls are used to establish
ancestry and eligibility.
In other cases, however, the Bureau has insisted with equal
conviction that descendants not affiliated with tribal governments
must be excluded from distribution. "[Glenerally descendants of
an aggrieved tribal group . . . are found to be the beneficiaries of a
resulting judgment only when there is no formally federally
recognized tribe that can be recognized as successor in interest to
the aggrieved tribe. "140 "Wherever possible, the Department
recommends to the Congress that Indian Claims Commission
awards be paid to tribal entities as they are constituted today,
rather than to a distant historic entity. "141
There has been confusion even when no modern tribal
organization exists, and the entire judgment must be distributed to
descendants. Choice among any number of old rolls as the basis for
determining eligibility has disenfranchised descendants
137. S. REP. No. 1000, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1972). Similarly, the Pembina Chippewa
award was divided among several modern Chippewa reservations in which the Pembina descendants
are a minority. See S. REP. No. 142, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1971).
138. S. REP. No. 1144, supra note 95, at 10; H. R. REP. No. 148, supra note 100, at 4-5.
139. 1980 Hearings, supra note 112, at 22. See S. REP. No. 1339, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970);
H. R. REP. No. 1425, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970); S. REP. No. 144, supra note 100, at 3, 5, 7; S.
REP. No. 393, supra note 100, at 4.
140. 1980 Hearings, supra note 112, at 22 (emphasis added).
141. S. REP. No. 851, supra note 100, at 4. See S. REP. No. 870, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1970)
(authorizing the preparation of a roll of persons whose lineal ancestors were members of the
confederated tribes ofWeas, Piankeshaws, Peorias, and Kaskaskias).
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arbitrarily. 142 Sometimes eligibility was limited to descendants with
a minimum quantum of Indian blood,14 3 and sometimes it was not,
over tribal objections. 144 In at least one instance, each person's
share of the award was computed by assigning an equal portion to
each tribal member alive in 1906, and subdividing each of these
portions equally among his descendants. 1
4 5
One person may be able to trace ancestry to several different
tribes, and thus assert eligibility to share in more than one award.
Here again Bureau practice has been anything but consistent. The
Bureau advised some tribes that it could not require individuals to
elect to share in only one of the awards to which they might be
eligible, 1 46 but then developed plans for other tribes that included
just such a condition.' 47 The only consistency, perhaps, in claims
judgment division has been that, contrary to Congress's
expectations in 1946, settlements tend to increase rather than
decrease tribal membership as remotely affiliated individuals seek
shares of the payment. 1
48
G. HOW.JUDGMENT FUNDS WERE USED
As a rule the Interior Department has resisted pressure,
characteristically from nonreservation descendant groups or
nonresident tribal members, 49 to distribute judgment funds
entirely in the form of direct "per capita" transfer payments.
Judgment funds often constitute the only source of
investment capital, and the Department is committed to a
policy of encouraging all Indian tribes to utilize their
judgment funds for the development of their resources -
both human and natural - which would yield lasting
benefits to a majority of the people involved. 1
50
"We regard the percentage to be used to fluctuate with the needs
and particular problems of each reservation," the Department told
Congress in 1970.' 51 In 1973 an eighty percent "guideline" ceiling
142. E.g., H. R. REP. No. 962, supra note 100, at 4, 7.
143. H. R. REP. No. 1427, supra note 73, at 4.
144. H. R. REP. No. 147, supra note 100, at 2, 4.
145. S. REP. No. 969, supra note 100, at 2.
146. H. R. REP. No. 1078, supra note 107, at 2-4, 6; H. R. REP. No. 148, supra note 100, at 2.
147. S. REP. No. 1144, supra note 95, at 9-10; H. R. REP. No. 148, supra note 100, at 5.
148. 1980 Hearing, supra note 112, at 176.
149. H. R. REP. No. 696, supra note 100, at 2. S. REP. No. 1339, supra note 139, at 9. See H. R.
REP. No. 1373, supra note 100, at 2; S. REP. No. 851, supra note 100, at 2-3; S. REP. No. 393, supra
note 100, at 18.
150. S. REP. No. 851, supra note 100, at 8.
151. S. REP. No. 1339, supra note 139, at 9.
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on per capita distribution was included in the Distribution of
Judgment Funds Act at the Department's request, ostensibly to
help tribes decide how to program their judgment funds. 52 Fully
per capita distributions have been recommended only when the
majority of tribal members reside off-reservation, 153 when the
tribe's federal status has been terminated and no recognized tribal
government exists, 54 or when the tribe's revenues from other
sources are deemed adequate.' 55 Whether candidly intended for
tribes' welfare, this policy is consistent with Congress's expectation
in 1946 that awards would be used to defray the cost of federal
reservation services.
Appendices 3 and 4 summarize all.judgment distribution plans
adopted by special legislation, or in accordance with the
Distribution of Judgment Funds Act. Notwithstanding official
Interior Department policy, nearly half of the distributions made
by act of Congress were fully per capita; regardless of the eighty
percent "guideline" in the Distribution of.Judgment Funds Act,
plans submitted after 1973 tend to distribute only about sixty-five
percent of awards per capita. More of a shift in favor of
."programing" awards, that is, spending funds on public
programs, is evident than federal policy statements would suggest.
Recent expansion of tribal government bureaucracies and services
under the Indian Self-Determination Act, with consequent
increased tribal fiscal needs, may be responsible.
There has been no characteristic pattern in "programing"
judgment funds. It is noteworthy, however, that in all areas except
"legal assistance," judgment funds have been used to pay for
programs for which federal grants-in-aid and contracts are
available. 5 6 This reinforces the likelihood that judgment funds
have been used to substitute for federal financing to which the
tribes would otherwise have been entitled, leaving them with no net
152. 1973 Indian judgment Funds Hearin.g, supra note 104, at 15-16, 21-22, 30, 36-38; S. REP. No.
167, supra note 104, at 6. The Bureau of Indian Affairs originally suggested 75 % programming. Id.
See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1403 (West Supp. 1981).
153. H. R. REP. No. 1349, supra note 100, at 2, 5-6; H. R. REP. No. 1350, supra note 100, at 3;
H. R. REP. No. 1425, supra note 73, at 8.
154. S. REP. No. 393, supra note 100, at 11; S. REP. No. 870, supra note 141, at 3; H. R. REP.
1422, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONc. &AD. NEws 1015 [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. No. 8701 (a feasible use of the money).
155. H. REP. No. 637, supra note 100, at 4.
156. E.g., Indian Financing Act, Pub. L. No. 262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A.
1451 (West Supp. 1981)); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 450 (Supp. 1980)); Tribally Controlled
Community College Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 471, 92 Stat. 1325 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A.
§ 1801 (West Supp. 1980)); Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978)
(codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1901 (West Supp. 1980)). See Heari ng on Federal Domestic Assistance Programs
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (federal grant-in-aid
programs available to municipal government and private nonprofit agencies).
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fiscal gain. Most plans provide, moreover, that actual
disbursements will be subject to Departmental approval;"5 7 the
tribe may have no choice but to spend judgment funds allocated to
"education" or "land acquisition" exactly as the Department
directs. Furthermore, unexpended "programed" judgment funds
ordinarily remain in Interior Department investment management
rather than in accounts directly accessible to the tribes. 158
Exceptions have been made only when the Department believes
that a tribe's officers "are capable of managing their own
affairs." 159 Departmental portfolios themselves leave much to be
desired, however. Interest rates are often low and aggregate rates
differ significantly from tribe to tribe. 160 One tribe has sued the
United States successfully for breach of trust in management of
recent investments. 
16 1
Most judgment funds have been paid per capita in one form or
another. No complete accounting for these funds has been
published, but congressional committee reports for the period
1972-1980 offer a sample of thirty-one planned distributions with
actual or estimated per capita shares. 162 Share size ranged from $55
to $7,050 with an average of $1,375. For the average reservation
family of about five persons, then, a claims judgment represented a
157. See infra apps. 3 & 4. Most tribal constitutions require that all fiscal acts be approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. See R. BARSH & .. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL
LIBERTY 116-17 (1980).
158. Statutory authority for Interior Department supervision of tribal investments is found in
the Act of.June 24, 1938, ch. 648, S 52 Stat. 1037 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. S 162a (West 1963)).
159. S. REP. No. 838, supra note 100, at 2. See H. R. REP. No. 641, 92d Cong., ist Sess. 3, 9
(1971) (disposition of judgmen" funds of the Pueblo of Loguna); S. REP. No. 409, supra note 100, at
2-3.
160. For examples of judgment fund investment portfolios, see S. REP. No. 1144, supra note 95,
at 3-5; S. REP. No. 141, supra note 100, at 9; S. REP. No. 142, supra note 137, at 9; S. REP. No. 973,
supra note 100, at 8; H. R. REP. No. 962, supra note 100, at 12; S. REP. No. 393, supra note 100, at
12; S. REP. No. 409, supra note 100, at 11; H. R. REP No. 147, supra note 100, at 6; H. R. REP. No.
148, supra note 100, at 8-10; H. R. REP. No. 151, supra note 100, at 9-10; S. REP. No. 1128, supra
note 100, at 12; S. REP. No. 870, supra note 141, at 5, 16; S. REP. No. 27, supra note 100, at 4-5; H.
R. REP. No. 637, supra note 100, at 5-7; S. REP. No. 142, supra note 137, at 6; S. REP. No. 144, supra
note 100, at 28, 30; S. REP. No. 851, supra note 100, at 21; S. REP. No. 848, supra note 100, at 6-7;
H. R. REP. No. 1421, 91st Cong., 2d Sess, 4 (1970) (distribution of funds appropriated to pay
Judgments in favor of the Sac and Fox Indians). See H. R. REP. No. 1350, supra note 100, at 2; H. R.
REP. No. 1423, supra note 100, at 12-13, 15. See also 1979,Judgment Funds Hearing, supra note 95, at 19-
20, 32.
161. Cheyenne Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Manchester
Band ofPomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
162. S. REP. No. 1383, supra note 100, at 5; S. REP. No. 1144, supra note 95, at2; S. REP. No.
141, supra note 100, at 1-3, 5; S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 137, at 3-4; H. R. REP. No. 697, supra
note 100, at 1-3; H. R. REP. No. 962, supra note 100, at 2-3; S. REP. No. 393, supra note 100, at 3-4;
H. 'R. REP. No. 147, supra note 100, at 1,3; H. R. REP. No. 696, supra note 100, at 2; S. REP. No.
1128, supra note 100, at 1-3; H. R. REP. No. 637, supra note 100, at 2, 19; H. R. REP. No. 639, supra
note 100, at 2; S. REP. No. 969, supra note 100, at 2; S. REP. No. 142, supra note 137, at 2, 4; S. REp.
No. 851, supra note 100, at 2-3; H. R. REP. No. 1422, supra note 154, at 2; H. R. REP. No. 1439,
supra note 100, at 2; H. R. REP. No. 1350, supra note 100, at 1-3; H. R. REP. No. 1348, supra note
100, at 2; H. R. REP. No. 1423, supra note 100, at 2; H. R. REP. No. 1425, supra note 139, at 4-5. See
Hearing on the Settlement of the Catawba Indian Land Claims Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
4ffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1979).
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one-time transfer payment of less than $7,000, or about enough to
purchase a new car or make a down payment on a residential
building. The shares of minor children, however, generally were
held for them by the Interior Department, so that the amount
actually available to the average family probably would be less than
$3,000. 163
Little is known of how per capita payments were used, but a
1971 survey of Shoshone tribal members anticipating a per capita
distribution is suggestive: forty-eight percent planned to use their
shares to make home improvements, twelve percent to pay off old
debts, twelve percent to buy cattle or make other income-
generating investments in personal property, ten percent to buy
land, seven percent to go back to school, five percent to buy cars,
and five percent undecided. 164 At least two-thirds of the Shoshone
payment, then, would have gone to consumption, as opposed to
investment in real or human capital. This should not be surprising,
considering the size of payments and the relative poverty of the
beneficiaries. Some tribes tried to steer their members' use of per
capita shares by requiring submission of "family plans" or budgets
as a condition for payment, on the model of BIA "general
assistance" transfer payments. 165 No amount of planning,
however, could have overcome the basic obstacle to effective
investment - the small size of shares.
As a general rule, special distribution legislation exempted per
capita shares from state and federal income taxes (Appendix 3), a
policy incorporated in section 7 of the Distribution of Judgment
Funds Act. Until 1973, however, per capita distributions often
resulted in payees' loss of eligibility under the Social Security
Act. 166 For this reason, many judgments resulted in no net gain to
tribal members and no net loss to the United States - other than
the administrative and judicial cost of defending against a claim,
preparing a plan, distributing checks, and then cancelling the
beneficiaries' Social Security Act accounts. At first, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs itself vociferously opposed immunizing per capita
payments from considerations of Social Security Act eligibility.
"We... do not believe that Indian people should be absolved from
participating in the Social Secuirty programs on the same basis as
163. See H. R. REP. No. 1304, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (distribution of judgment funds to
Yakima Indian nation) (efforts by Yakima Tribe to permit parents to use minor children's share of
judgment funds).
164. S. REP. No. 393, supra note 100, at 18.
165. See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 696, supra note 100, at 4, 16; H. R. REP. No. 1348, supra note
100. at 2; S. REP. No. 1128, supra note 100, at 1-2.
166. 1973 Indian ]udgment Funds Hearing, supra note 104, at 31.
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other people.' 1 67 As usual, statements of this breadth concealed
inconsistencies. For example, Congress specially exempted from
Social Security consideration Sioux claims judgment beneficiaries
on the multi-tribal Fort Hall and Fort Belknap reservations; when
Assiniboine descendants on the same reservations were to share in
another award, the Bureau argued for making another exception,
fearing a sense of inequity and "friction" between the two
neighbor tribes. 
168
The Distribution 'of Judgment Funds Act finally extended an
exemption from Social Secuirty Act eligibility for all per capita
distributions, at the suggestion of the Senate Subcommittee on
Indian Affairs and with the Interior Department's blessings. 169 The
1973 Act did not disturb the growing Administration opposition to
immunizing per capita payments from attachment to satisfy
payees' "just" debts. However, some early distribution legislation
did provide immunity from debts, at the Interior Department's
suggestion. (Appendix 3) "The lien provision in past judgment
fund distribution legislation has been a device to discourage.
persons, especially car dealers and other merchants from selling
articles on credit at inflated prices to Indians when a per capita
payment from judgment funds was contemplated," the
Department explained in 1970.170 That year, however, Congress
concluded that "the Department of the Interior has been unable to
offer any facts to justify a retention of the provision" and it was
discontinued. 171 The Department promptly revised its opinions and
declared:
We believe Indians should be in the same status as other
citizens with respect to obligation for just debts and
eligibility to participate in welfare programs, unless
factors such as isolation, abject poverty, illiteracy, and
other social problems have hampered an Indian group
from developing sensible purchasing habits and left them
easily victimized by unscrupulous merchants. 1
72
167. H. R. REP. No. 639, supra note 100, at 5.
168. H. R. REP. No. 1078, supra note 107, at 3, 7.
169. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 104, at 2. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West Supp. 1981).
170. S. REP. No. 1339, supra note 139, at 10. See S. REP No. 870, supra note 141, at 10; H. R.
REP. No. 1422, supra note 154, at 4. Consistent with this theory, anti-debt language was not
recommended when the tribes are "as experienced and sophisticated in business matters as their
non-Indian neighbors." H. R. REP. No. 962, supra note 100, at 7. See H. R. REP. No. 697, supra
note 100, at 2.
171. H. R. REP. No. 1423, supra note 100, at 2.
172. S. REP. No. 969, supra note 100, at 5. See H. R. REP. No. 639, supra note 100, at 5. See H.
R. REP. No. 639, supra note 100, at 5.
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H. CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PHILOSOPHY IN RETROSPECT
The Interior Department's practice of reporting on tribal
socioeconomic status in support of judgment distribution bills over
the period 1960-1973 offers some insight into the essential
assimilationist spirit of claims settlement policy. Under a
subheading referring to the readiness of Indians to manage their
own affairs, BIA socioeconomic reports assessed each claimant
tribe's competence or capability to handle money and property,
both as a test of the need for federal supervision of the use of
judgment funds and as a signal for possible termination. A tribe
was deemed "capable" if, for example, its members lacked the
"physical characteristics of Indians [and] move about in the
community without notice," or "[i]n terms of appearance,
material possessions and educational achievment [they] compare
quite favorably with the non-Indian population. ' 173 It was
important that tribal members have no interest in communal
property and share the common interests of their non-Indian
neighbors; they should also attend public schools and local churches
and participate in local and State elections. 174 A competent tribe's
"leaders [must] have shown a willingness and ability to press
toward acculturation" and to cooperate with non-Indian
agencies; 175 its members must "understand taxes and taxation"
and must have "accepted their responsibilites as citizens. "176
BIA researchers classified as unprepared for self-
determination, tribal members who "live[d] in socially isolated
communities and follow[ed] old Indian customs and traditions," or
were "slow to accept strangers and slow to make friends in a
dominant society of high mobility and quick familiarity. ",'77 These
tribes had "not accepted or adapted their lives to the pressures,
obligations and responsibilities which the surrounding community
demands" and "would suffer a rather deep cultural shock if
required to manage their own affairs." 178 Sometimes the Bureau
had difficulty weighing the evidence for tribal "readiness,"
however. In describing the Hualapais, a 1970 report observed:
Members of the Hualapai have been living in close
173. S. REP. No. 141, supra note 100, at 15; S. REP. No. 969, supra note 100, at 15.
174. S. REP. No. 141, supra note 100, at 19; H. R. REP. No. 962, supra note 100, at 17.
175. S. REP. No. 848, supra note 100, at 22; H. R. REP. No. 1373, supra note 100, at 17; H. R.
REP. No. 639, supra note 100, at 12.
176. S. REP. No. 141, supra note 100, at 15; S. REP. No. 27, supra note 100, at 17.
177. S. REP. No. 27, supra note 100, at 13; S. REP. No. 393, supra note 100, at 36.
178. S. REP. No. 976, supra note 100, at 13-14; H. R. REP. No. 151, supra note 100, at 13.
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contact with non-Indians for many years. They wear
white man's clothing, trade with white merchants, mingle
with non-Indians in towns and villages, and have worked
with white people over the years. However, they are still
superstitious, still have little to do with doctors and
churches, and their medicine men remain potent factors
in their daily lives . . . [Tlhey have a long way to go
before they will be ready to manage all of their own
affairs. 179
The Bureau self-consciously described its responsibility to "assist
[Indians] in the acculturation process" and decried tribes' "deep
and widespread apprehension that any assumption of a greater
degree of self-determination is part of a scheme to hasten
termination of the Federal trust relationship. "180
When these reports were written in the early 1970's, the of-
ficial understanding of Indian claims settlement plainly was as it
had been in 1946: payment for tribal lands simply was a necessary
step in preparing tribes for assimilation and political dissolution.
Tribes manifesting non-Indian habits in dress, politics, and
religion were entitled to prompt liberation from federal
supervision; those retaining the values and institutions of tribal life
required continued oversight and regulation. The objective in
settlement was extinction of Indian's surviving special legal rights
as Indians, rather than reconstruction of tribal economies crippled
by nineteenth-century federal land policies.
IV. THE ALASKA SETTLEMENT
A. THE PROBLEM AND THE PROPOSALS
We are testing the American political system .... If there
is no settlement or a poor one [iut may bring defeatism to
the people and prevent us from becoming an integral part
of Alaska's social and economic development. Our
present political influence will diminish, and the efforts to
develop our communities will falter. 181
In the words of one Senate report, Native land rights in Alaska
179. H. R. REP. No. 1348, supra note 100, at 14.
180. H. R. REP. No. 1350, supra note 100, at 9; H. R. REP. No. 151, supra note 100, at 26.
181. Alaska Native Claims: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 169 (1971) (remarks of William Hensley, Alaska State Senator) [hereinafter cited as 1971
Alaska Native Claims Hearing].
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never were "complicated" by treaties;' z2 they were characterized
instead by nearly a century of complete neglect. Alaska's first
Territorial Organic Act in 1884 merely provided that "Indians and
other persons . . .not be disturbed in the possession of any lands
actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them but the
terms under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is
reserved for future legislation by Congress." 1 83 An 1891 law
authorized the issuance of parents for business purposes, subject to
"actual occupation" by the Natives,18 4 and in 1898, Congress
empowered the Secretary of the Interior to reserve riparian and
coastal areas for Native use.' 85  Under 1926 legislation, the
Secretary also could issue inalienable trust deeds for coastal and
townsite lands to Natives, and in 1936, Congress gave the Secretary
general authority to designate any lands previously reserved for
Native use as "Indian reservations." '' 8 6 Only a few small
reservations were established, however.'8 7 When Alaska became a
state in 1959, the issue of Native lands remained unsolved, the new
State agreeing merely to disclaim any interest in lands to which
Natives already had "right or title.'1
8
In what was to prove a prophetic message, Assistant Secretary
of the Interior William Warne told a Senate Committee in 1948
that absence of urgent pressure from settlers had encouraged the
government to "procrastinate" on settling Native lands. 189
"Neither the native nor the white settler can so order his affairs as
to make the most of his opportunities if there is known neither the
validity nor the extent of his land titles," Warne argued, advising
Congress to "fac[e] the brick-bats" at once rather than permit
insecure landownership to chill Alaska's development. "The
traditional method of dealing with the Indian land problem in the
States," by treaties of cession, "has worked pretty well on the
whole" and cost the country less than what the land was worth; to
182. S. REP. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2192 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 4051. See 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at
451-52, 459. It is also relevant that in the treaty of cession with Russia, 15 Stat. 539 (1867), the
United States promised that natives would be "protected in the enjoyment of their rights, property
and religion." Id. at 542.
183. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24. Congress's intent was "absolutely to save the
rights of all occupying Indians in that Territory. 15 CoNG. REc. 531 (remarks of Sen.
Harrison).
184. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, g 12, 26 Stat. 1095.
185. Act of May 14, 1898, ch. 299, § 1,30 Stat. 409. Administrative decisions under this law are
summarized in 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing', supra note 181, at 365-66.
186. Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 379, 44 Stat. 629; Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, S 2, 49 Stat. 1250.
187. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 362 n. 5. One reservation previously
had been established by a special act of Congress. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 15, 26 Stat.
1095.
188. Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
189. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 362, 364, 369.
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be "non-discriminatory," Congress also ought to afford Alaskan
Natives the option of selling their surplus acreage. 190
Warne and Secretary of the Interior Krug opposed, as prob-
ably unconstitutional, Alaskan proposals that Congress simply
extinguish native title by law and settle the issue of compensation in
the courts. 191 The Indian Claims Commission was just two years
old, but the Interior Department hoped judicial delay could be
avoided in dealing with lands in Alaska. 192 If litigation was
unavoidable, however, the Department opined that Natives could
make out a claim of actual use or occupancy to not more than
30,000,000 acres, or about 190 acres per Native. 193 Following on the
heels of the Second World War, the settlement would need to be
one that left the Natives "thoroughly imbued with loyalty and trust
towards the Federal Government" and which assured the
"eliminat[ion] of bureau controls over Indian lands just as rapidly
as we can persuade the natives to go along with us.'
1 94
As Warne predicted, Congress did nothing until economic
urgency made settlement a necessity. The catalyst was discovery of
major petroleum reserves in the Arctic Slope region of the State,
and resulting plans for a pipeline to run down a special federal
corridor from the oil fields to the port of Valdez. 195 Although under
its Enabling Act, Alaska was entitled to 103,000,OOC
acres, as yet only seven percent of the state was privately or state-
owned, the balance being federally administered land under cloud
of Native claims. 196 Assertion of unsurrendered Native rights in the
courts could have frozen pipeline construction, and in 1968 an
Alaska State Task Force proposed a comprehensive settlement
plan. 97 Each Native village of twenty-five or more Native residents
would select adjacent lands in proportion to its population, up to a
statewide total of 40,000,000 acres. In addition, Natives would
enjoy special services financed by a ten percent royalty on the
development of offshore minerals and a five percent royalty on the
future development of state-owned public domain, and would be
able to obtain revocable subsistence use permits to lands
throughout the State. Villages could reconvey their lands in fee
190. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 363-67.
191. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 368.
192. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 369.
193. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 371-72.
194. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 370-71.
195. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 1-2, 294, 312. See H. R. REP. No. 523,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1971) (settlement of land claims of Alaska Natives).
196. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 283.
197. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 349-52.
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simple to private parties, but lands and funds held and used by the
villages themselves would remain tax-exempt.
To administer Native property under this plan, the Task Force
recommended "recognizing private property concepts and utilizing
modern corporate forms for engaging in business enterprise"
whenever feasible. Apart from any existing municipal or tribal
government, 198 each village would incorporate under state or
federal law for business purposes. 199 For "better and more effective
leadership," each Native regional group would incorporate as well,
and disputes as to the application and administration of the
settlement would be reviewed by an Alaska Native Commission
appointed by the President. The Alaska Federation of Natives was
generally in agreement with the Task Force approach, but insisted
upon a 60,000,000 acre settlement with selection not restricted to
village sites, a $500,000,000 cash payment, and a two
percent royalty on all public domain development in the state.
20 0
The Federation also opposed including nonresidents of Alaska in
any plan.
20 1
In January of 1969, the Secretary of the Interior froze all
further selection and conveyance of Alaska public domain,
20 2
effectively suspending petrochemical development and forcing the
Native settlement issue on Congress.
B. CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
Alaska land settlement fell under the influence of Washington
Senator Henry Jackson, a veteran of the 1946 Indian Claims
Commission Act hearings who was anxious to avoid repeating past
mistakes. "I think the worst result of the Indian Claims
Commission Act is that we thought by adjudicating these claims we
had achieved a final settlement," he told his Senate colleagues in
1971. "It is clear in my mind that the younger generation of
Indians feels that it was no settlement at all. "203 Unlike litigation,
a legislative solution could be "statewide and appl[y] to all Native
198. Most villages either formed municipalities under Alaska's Territorial Indian Village Act,
1915 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 11, amended by 1917 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 25, repealed by 1929 Alaska
Sess. Laws ch. 23, or formed constitutional tribal governments pursuant to section 16 of the Indian
Reorganization Act. Act of.June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 987 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 476
(West 1963)) (made applicable to Alaska by 25 U.S.C.A. § 473a (West Supp. 1981)).
199. Federal incorporation would have been in accordance with title 25, section 477, ol the
United States Code Annotated. 25 U.S.C.A. § 477 (West 1963).
200. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 354-57.
201. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 458.
202. Pub. Land Order No. 4582, 34 Fed. Reg. § 1025 (1969). See 35 Fed. Reg. § 18 874 (1970).
203. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 451.
INDIAN LAND CLAIMS
groups . . . regardless of ethnic affiliation.'' 20 4 It could be more
"creative" and more "flexible," a "surer, more complex and
imaginative solution than simply confirming or denying land titles
to specific tracts and awarding cash compensation. "205 Settlement
legislation should, Jackson argues, serve "not only as a means of
settling the legal claims, but also an opportunity to provide a
foundation for social and economic advancement" of Natives and
the State's economy as a whole.
20 6
The Congress has an opportunity in this last major
settlement between the United States and the Native
peoples of America to arrive at a more just and hopefully,
a wiser resolution than has been typical of our country's
history in dealing with Native people in other times and
in other states.
20 7
Although the official Senate report on settlement declared that
the "key to Native progress, and thus the single most important
facet of the land settlement legislation, is money," land was 208 of
chief importance to Native groups themselves and was a necessary
element of settlement lest Natives feel "cheated. ' 20 9 Describing
land as "today's certainty and tomorrow's promise," the Alaska
Federation of Natives dismissed cash payment as "merely
welfare. "210 "The Alaskan Native, perhaps more than any other
people on this planet, is an intimate part of his land . . . . Our
people are a land people. Our survival, mentally and physically,
depends on the land. ,21 1 The State was unable, however, to accept
the Federation's demand for 60,000,000 acres. "[Wihere is the
land to come from, that Congress gave to the State of Alaska as its
dowry, in order to permit us to survive as a State?" Alaska Senator
Ted Stevens asked his fellow legislators.
2 12
Congressional discomfiture with land proposals revealed the
204. S. Rep. No. 405, supra note 182, at 79. See 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181,
at 517.
205. S. Rep. No. 405, supra note 182, at 78. See Hearings on Alaska Native Land Claims Before the
Senate Comm- on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969
Alaska Native Land Claims Hearing]. "I think it is unfortunate that ... [lawyers] will not recognize that
there is more than one way to satisfy a right other than litigation." 1971 Alaska Native claims Hearing,
supra note 181, at 473 (remarks of Alaska Sen. Ted Stevens).
206. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 290, 293-94; 1969 Alaska Native Land
Claims Hearing, supra note 205, at 1-2.
207. S. REP. No. 405, supra note 182, at 61-62.
208. S. REp. No. 405, supra note 182, at 105.
209. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 168, 174, 270-71, 285. Many natives
felt "cheated," nonetheless. See E. TREISMAN, THE FAST TREATY 250 (1946).
210. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 528-29.
211. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 304.
212. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 175.
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persistence of assimilationist sentiments. "I am really concerned
philosophically whether or not we are going to establish a bunch of
enclaves, separating the Natives from the non-Native population,"
Senator Jackson explained, "at a time when we want to try and
bring all minority peoples together." 213 This provoked the Alaska
Federation of Natives to retort:
Land is the foundation of culture, and landownership is a
basic principle of our society. That is why it is accorded
supreme protection by our laws. The Natives of Alaska,
the rightful owners of its land, are entitled to better
treatment than to be deprived of practically all of the
land, and of their culture, upon the excuse that such
deprival is required in order to prevent enforced
separation of the races.
214
Native representatives urged Congress not to think of the
settlement as "welfare." "We are not asking for anything. We are
offering the U.S. Government 84 percent of our property. "215
Uneasiness over land proposals also belied widespread
government awarness of the Indian Claims Commission Act's
shortcomings. "And what do we do about the Indians who didn't
get anything like this?" Senator Jackson wondered at the 1971
Senate hearings. "Do we go back now and say, in your State and
mine, that . . .we are going to apportion land on the same basis
retroactively?" 2 1 6 Both Congress and the Administration agreed to
avoid the possibility of undoing adjudicated claims in the
contiguous forty-eight states and, as enacted, the settlement plan
declares that it is not intended to be "a precedent for reopening,
renegotiating, or legislating upon any past settlement involving
land claims or other matters with any Native organizations, or any
tribe, band, or identifiable group of American Indians.
21 7
Congress would soon learn, however, that the political
consequences of manifest inequity cannot be legislated away.
When it met in 1971, the Ninety-second Congress had before
it two alternative Alaska Native settlement plans. Sponsored by
Senator Jackson, S.35 offered Natives $500,000,000 raised by a
two percent royalty on federal mineral revenues from Alaska lands,
and any balance after twelve years from congressional
213. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 171.
214. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 522, 526.
215. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 169,312,475,489.
216. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 172.
217.43 U.S.C.A. § 1601(d) (West 1980).
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appropriations. 218 Each Native village of at least twenty-five
residents that was not of a "modern and urban character" also
would be entitled to select and "promptly" receive a patent for the
equivalent of about sixty adjacent, "contiguous and compact acres
per villager." Individual villagers would then receive deeds for
their own occupation and private use, and some small land grants
outside village areas would be made to preserve key subsistence
acres, such as hunting camps. A hierarchy of state-incorporated
Native organizations would administer the settlement, supervised
by a Presidentially selected Alaska Native Commission. Native
residents of Native villages would be members of village
corporations. Alaska residents living in urban, non-Native areas
such as Anchorage and.Juneau would be eligible for membership in
an urban corporation, and Natives residing outside of the State
would participate in a national corporation. A statewide Native
non-profit corporation, Alaska Native Services and Development
Corporation (ANSDC), would distribute cash from the settlement
fund and provide assistance to the village, urban, and national
corporations. ANSDC would be governed by a board of directors
elected from the subsidiary Native corporations, and assisted by
twelve regional "advisory boards" representing the State's
principal Native cultural areas. To meet its expenses, ANSDC
would be granted 1.5 million acres over and above village land
selections. There also would be an Alaska Native Investment
Corporation (ANIC) organized wholly for business purposes, and
each Native would be issued 100 shares of ANIC stock with voting
rights. After twelve years, all settlement corporations could elect
either to liquidate or to reincorporate as for-profit enterprises.
The most far-reaching aspects of S.35 were political rather
than economic. Native organizations created for purposes of the
settlement would be taxed and regulated to the same extent as other
state corporations, with the exception of a twelve-year tax holiday
for mineral revenues. Village lands also would be governed by state
laws, and villages would be required to reorganize as state
municipalities as soon as they met the State's requirements. By
1976 all special federal responsibility for Alaska Natives would
cease. "Protective" supervisory functions would be exercised
temporarily by the Alaska Native Commission (enrollment, land
218. The text of Senate Bill 35 is set out in 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181.
Senate Bill 1830, which passed the Senate in 1970 but failed to win House approval, differed from
Senate Bill 35 because it offered natives only $100,000,000 and a 10% mineral royalty for 10 years.
1969 Alaska Native Land Claims Hearing, supra note 205. For legislative history prior to these 1969 and
1971 hearings, see Hearings on Alaska Native Land Claims Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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selection, approval of village charters and budgets) and by the
Alaska Native Services and Development Corporation (approval of
village programs and village land transactions), rather than the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
An alternative plan (S.835) cosponsored by Senators Fred
Harris and Ted Kennedy was more generous.2 19 While S.35 would
,have given Natives at most ten million acres, S.835 adopted the
Alaska Federation of Natives' goal of sixty million acres. Villages
would be able to choose five hundred, not sixty acres per Native
villager. The Harris-Kennedy plan also spread part of the cost of
settlement directly on the State, combining a federal cash payment
of $50,000,000 with an additional two percent royalty on all future
state and federal land development, including both minerals and
timber. Subsistence activities would be protected by extension of
statewide hunting and fishing rights for 100 years, rather than by
deeding Natives isolated parcels of land.
The Harris-Kennedy plan proposed organizing a single
statewide distribution corporation (Alaska Native Development
Corporation) and twelve regional corporations. Regardless of
actual residence, Natives would have to apply for membership in
some village and region, subject to protest and review by the Alaska
Native Commission. Settlement funds would pass from the
Development Corporation to the regions, and seventy-five percent
of the regions' shares would be redistributed to village
corporations. The active for-profit focus would be at the regional
level. Natives would each receive 100 shares of regional corporation
stock, inalienable for twenty years. At the expiration of that period,
regions would become, for all practical purposes, conventional
public for-profit corporations.
The Harris-Kennedy settlement also would have preserved
some elements of Natives'special federal status. Villages could elect
to retain reservation lands held in trust for them by the United
States, and to incorporate under federal, rather than state laws.
Village lands would remain exempt from state property taxation for
fifty years. Special federal services would continue to be available to
Natives to the extent that they were provided to Indians in the
contigous forty-eight states.
22 0
Four general principles summarize the settlement proposals:
219. The text of Senate Bill 835 is set out in 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearin,,, supra note 181.
220. An Administration bill, S.1571, differed from Senate Bill 835 only in providing that the
statewide Alaska Native Development Corporation, rather than regional corporations, would hold
title to mineral rights beneath village land selections. Interior Secretary Rogers Morton took the
position that Natives should get 10,000,000 acres and no mineral royalties, but in 1971 he told
Congress that he had "changed his mind." 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 448-
49.
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transfer of BIA supervisory duties to Native organizations;
transfer of primary responsibility for Native services to the State;
reorganization of tribal Natives and their lands to state laws and
taxation; and conversion of Natives' collective property rights from
sovereign territoriality to corporate shareholdership. All of these
changes were to be achieved gradually over a period of transition
ranging from twelve to fifty years, providing Natives a temporary
cultural shelter and implicit subsidies, in the form of limited
freedom from state control, for rapid economic growth.
Comparison with the 1887 General Allotment ("Dawes") Act
is inescapable. Under that plan, Congress, hoping to accelerate the
socioeconomic assimilation of tribes, directed the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to survey and subdivide reservations, assigning each Indian
an "allotment" of 160 acres for agricultural purposes and opening
the balance of "surplus" reservation acreage to non-Indian
settlers. 221 Inheritable, but inalienable without BIA approval,
allotments were deliberately scattered to prevent the survival of
predominantly Indian communities. After a twenty-five year
"trust" period, the allotment and allottee were to become subject
to state laws and taxation, and federal supervision was to cease.
Advocates of the policy argued that communalism and dependence
upon federal aid were preserving tribal poverty. They believed that
starting off each individual Indian with a modest parcel of private
property and relative freedom to develop it would stimulate
enterprise and bring about through experience what education had
failed to achieve: adoption of competitive Western socioeconomic
values.
222
Allotment proved to be an economic disaster for tribes.
Between the surplus acreage and allottees' approved sales of
allotments to non-Indians, roughly half of all remaining Indian
land was lost. 223 The Bureau of Indian Affairs argued that Indians
had been unprepared for the responsibilities of agriculture, and
hence had failed to succeed within the twenty-five year shelter the
law afforded.2 24 The Bureau's solution was to extend the "trust"
221. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
222. D. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (1973); AMERICANIZING
THE AMERICAN INDIANS (F. Prucha ed. 1973); Price, A Moment in History: The Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, 8 U.C.L.A. - ALASKA L. REV. 89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Price, A Moment in
Historyl.
223. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, RESERVATION AND RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION 23 (1976).
224. Hearing to Grant Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Purposes of Local
Self-Government and Economic Enterprise, Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-
30 (1934); Hearing on the Readjustment of Indian Affairs Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 15-19 (1934). See R. BARSH & .1. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND
POLITICAL LIBERTY 63-66, 100 (1980).
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period indefinitely, intensify federal services and oversight, and
selectively decontrol the lands of individual Indians as they were
administratively adjudged to have become "competent.' '225
There is compelling evidence, however, that allotment failed
because of "trust" restrictions. Lacking the power of alienation,
allottees were unable to finance improvements by mortgaging their
lands. In agriculture, an industry characterized by cyclical debt,
inability to borrow guarantees failure. Under the "trust" then,
allotted lands fallowed. 22 6 When the "trust" ended, allottees'
undeveloped lands were more valuable when sold than retained.
Many allotments had to be sold before the "trust" ended to
provide for the necessities of life, and the Bureau encouraged
premature sales. 227 Others were sold by state authorities for taxes;
tax payments became due as soon as the "trust" ended, offering
allottees little time to take advantage of their new freedom from
restrictions on credit.
Allotment and the Alaskan settlement share many features.
Under both plans Natives were assumed to be more interested in
acquiring private property and becoming state citizens than in
retaining jurisdiction and authority as political communities. The
form of private property offered under each plan was what policy
architects believed most compatible with the economy of the times:
in the late ninteenth century, yeoman agriculture, and in the late
twentieth century, the large industrial corporation. All economic
eggs were placed, by law, in a single organizational basket. Periods
of tax immunity and inalienability were provided to protect tribes'
first efforts at management, without any consideration of the effect
on credit. Temporary immunity was necessary in the first place
only because newly created property rights were placed generally
under state, rather than tribal jurisdiction; Indians probably would
not have taxed or regulated themselves out of their rights had they
retained territorial governing authority. Neither allotment nor the
Native settlement in Alaska significantly reduced federal services
costs. In fact, federal costs actually increased, due in large part to
added administrative responsibilities.
2 2 8
225. A contemporary reflection on this theory is found in Fuller, Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act: Analysis of the Protective Clauses of the Act Through a Comparison with the Dawes Act of 1887, 4 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 269 (1977).
226. See Trosper, American Indian Relative Ranching Efficiency, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 503 (1978).
Non-agricultural extractive uses generally were restrained. See Barsh, U.S. v. Mitchell Decision Narrows
Trust Responsibility, 6 (8) AM. INDIAN L. REV. 5 (1980).
227. See INDIAN AFFAIRS POLICY CIRCULAR ON FORCED FEE TRANSACTIONS (1917), reprinted in
Hearing on Statute of Limitations Extension Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
168-70 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Statute of Limitations Hearingl.
228. See Barsh, The B. LA. Reorganization Follies qf 1978: A Lesson in Bureaucratic Self-Defense, 7 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 11 (1979).
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C. THE SETTLEMENT
The choice before Congress was complicated by fundamental
disagreement among Natives, state officials, and the federal,
administration. For example, Native groups could not agree
whether settlement lands and funds should be allocated among
regions by population or by area.229 Emphasis upon development
of regional, rather than statewide corporations for fund distribution
and investment was shared by all Native organizations. "It is a
simple, unalterable fact that Alaska's Natives are composed of
separate ethnic groups having no ties other than a common native
heritage," Arctic Slope spokesman Charles Edwardsen told
Congress.2 30 Alaska Federation of Natives President Donald
Wright agreed that regional corporations would be more responsive
to Native needs, predicting that in a single statewide corporation
"there will be substantial competing pressures from the various
regional organizations - each attempting to get the most for its
particular group. "231 But while the existing regional Native
associations urged basing eligibility for settlement benefits on
residence, a vocal group of nonresident Natives, chiefly from the
Seattle area, urged Congress to enroll Natives on the basis of
blood.
232
The Administration had agreed, officially, with the Harris-
Kennedy model, but at congressional hearings Interior
Department officials reneged and opposed granting land to Native
villages. Calling for "flexibility" in public land management, the
Department proposed instead that all Native needs, outside of
village sites, be handled through a system of federal permits.
233 "I
just hope that we... don't create something in Alaska that will not
permit an orderly and equitable development of the State,"
Secretary Morton explained, "not only for the Native Alaskan, but
also for all Alaskans, and for all Americans." 234 Natives rejected
the permit concept as discriminatory and insecure; the State
neglected it, perhaps fearing that it might set a precedent for
limiting state land selection rights. Alaska Governor Egan insisted
that his state immediately assume full jurisdiction and taxing
power over the settlement area, but was equally concerned that
229. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 306, 312.
230. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 313.
231. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 304.
232. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 556. The State of Alaska supported
AFN's position on the reasonableness of concentrating power and wealth at the regional, rather than
state level. Id. at 518.
233. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 275-79, 281, 287, 447.
234. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 284.
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Congress retain financial responsibility for Natives' services. 235
Naturally, the Administration opposed this convenient separation
of power and accountability.
As enacted in 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) tempered the major features of the Harris-Kennedy plan
with occasional deference to Senator Jackson's wishes. Natives
receive nearly $1,000,000,000, $462,500,000 contributed by
federal taxpayers, and $500,000,000 generated by a two percent
temporary royalty on federal and state development of Alaska
lands. 236 Natives also select 40,000,000 acres: 22,000,000 for
villages at a rate of approximately 400 acres per villager;
16,000,000 for regional corporations allocated by regions'
geographic areas, together with the subsurface rights to village
selections; and 2,000,000 for individuals and groups not sharing in
village entitlements. Village land selections are to be patented by
the Secretary of the Interior "immediately" after setting aside
reasonably sufficient rights-of-way for public uses. Villages
themselves are responsible for reconveying land to individual
Natives and, "as necessary for community expansion," to any
existing municipalities.
By eliminating statewide organizations, ANCSA's
distribution hierarchy agrees more closely with Native wishes than
either the Harris-Kennedy or Jackson approaches. Settlement
funds are distributed directly to regional corporations in proportion
to their populations. Regionals remit ten percent of these funds
directly to Native shareholders, and fifty percent of all regional
revenues to village corporations and nonvillage ("at large")
shareholders. Regionals also are required to share with one another
seventy percent of "all revenues received by them" from timber
and subsurface development - in effect a perpetual Native royalty
on other Natives' lands.
In addition to twelve geographical regional corporations for
"Natives having a common heritage and sharing common
interests," there is a thirteenth regional corporation for Natives
who did not elect or qualify to enroll in the other twelve. 237 To
235. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Heari ng, supra note 181, at 512, 515.
236. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West Supp. 1981). The Act's provisions are summarized well in
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM., SPECIAL.JOINT TASK FORCE REPORT ON ALASKAN NATIVE
ISSUES 1-12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT I . It should be noted that $2,000,000 was
deducted from the settlement to pay the fees and expenses of the lawyers who had represented native
groups, an interesting precedent not since repeated. See Pub. L. No. 92-203, S 20, 85 Stat. 688 (1976)
(codified at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1619 (West Supp. 1981)).
237. Litigation resulted in the amendment of ANCSA to organize the thirteenth regional
corporation for nonresident Natives. Pub. L. No. 94-204, 89 Stat. 1149 (1976). See 1971 Alaska Native
Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 559-60.
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qualify for ANCSA benefits, villages must satisfy the Secretary of
the Interior that they have at least twenty-five residents, the
majority of them Natives, and that they are not of a modern and
urban character.
ANCSA compromises the protectiveness of the Harris-
Kennedy proposal with Jackson's goal of rapid legal assimilation.
Redistribution of settlement funds among Native corporations and
their shareholders is permanently tax-exempt, and cannot be
considered as income in computing eligibility for federal grants and
transfer payments. Native lands are taxable at the end of twenty
years, however, and land revenues are taxable at once. All Native
corporations must be organized under Alaska state law, although
they remain exempt from federal securities laws for twenty years.
During this period of immunity, Natives' shares are inheritable,
but voting rights can be exercised only by Native heirs, and shares
cannot be sold. All "trust" restrictions, reservation land
withdrawals, and allotment laws are terminated. BIA
responsibility for services remains, by implication of ANCSA's
silence and Natives' inclusion in subsequent federal Indian
legislation, 238 but approval of village corporate charters and village
expenditures of settlement funds is now the responsibility of
regional corporations.
D. SETTLEMENT IMPLEMENTATION
However well-intentioned and generous, by historical
standards, ANCSA never worked quite the way it was planned.
Implementation was entangled from the start in costly federal
administrative "white tape," suspending Native rights while
ANCSA's time limits ran out. The complex hierarchy of new
organizations designed to facilitate Native economic growth were
embroiled in overlapping and conflicting responsibilities and
competing interests. Natives' chief concern throughout the
settlement planning process, control of land for both subsistence
and growth, now appears unlikely. Four principal problems of
federal law and administration have been encountered:
administrative discretion; delays in land management; taxation of
Native lands; and alienability of shares. Additionally, there are four
organizational problems: overlapping local organizations; village-
region conflicts; conflict among regions; and elites and value
conflicts. These have resulted in internal conflict and merit
particular attention.
238. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.A. S 1452(c), 1603(d), 1801(2), 1903(8) (West Supp. 1981).
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1. Administrative Discretion
ANCSA implementation was entrusted to the Secretary of the
Interior rather than an independent Alaska Native Commission.
Departmental responsibilites included preparing the final roll of
eligible Natives (at a cost of nearly $1,000,000),239 clas-
sifying villages for eligibility, surveying and reviewing Native
land selections, locating public easements, and patenting final land
selections to Natives, village corporations, and regional
corporations. Natives were soon complaining that the Department
took an unreasonable amount of time to adopt rules for these
procedures, and applied inappropriate standards to decisions. For
example, in classifying villages as "of an urban and modern
character," the Department and Natives disagreed over the weight
to be given paved streets, electricity, plumbing, and the availability
of local medical care. 240 Furthermore, the Department accused
Natives of resurrecting long-abandoned villages simply to qualify
for ANCSA subsidies, and Natives accused the Department of
ignoring justifiable temporary abandonments, such as followed the
State's catastrophic earthquake a few years earlier.
241
Regional corporations found themselves strapped by both the
costs of complying with Departmental regulations and paperwork,
and of frequent lawsuits necessitated by the Department's failures
to follow its own rules. 242 "[T]heir capacity to drain us of energy is
awe-inspiring," Cook Inlet Region's Roy Huhndorf told a
congressional investigation in 1976.243 Cumulative costs of land
selection alone had, by that year, reached from $20 to as much as
$400 per Native shareholder, with considerable variation among
regions. 244
2. Delays in Land Management
The Department of the Interior was charged with
simultaneously managing Native land selections and identifying
which Alaska lands would be reserved permanently by the United
239. Hearing on Alaska Native Claims Before the House Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife, qf the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974
Hearing]. See Hearing on Alaska Native Enrollment Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
240. See 1974 Hearing, supra note 239, at 58-59, 107-09, 145-46, 156.
241. 1974 Hearing, supra note 239, at 112, 141.
242. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 17, 25, 56, 61-62, 73; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
REVIEW COMM., FINAL REPORT 497 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
243. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 32.
244. Computed from nine regional corporations' financial annual reports for the period of 1973-
1976. Reports are the courtesy of the corporations' executive officers.
INDIAN LAND CLAIMS
States for public purposes. "Gross delay" in reviewing and
patenting Native selections has been "seriously eroding the value of
the settlement to the Natives," the American Indian Policy Review
Commission concluded.2 45 The Department argues that the job
simply is too vast to complete in a few years, 246 but Natives accuse
Departmental officials of preoccupation with locating and
surveying public easements. Public easements could restore as
much as one-fourth of Natives' land selections to federal and state
ownership or, under a proposal for "floating" easements for future
development, cloud title to every acre of the Native entitlement.
247
As one Eskimo spokesman put it, "They're going to ease us right
out of our land. "248 Although villages affected by public right-of-
way may select alternative lands, state land selections have been
proceeding while Native land conveyances remain stalled. Many
villages, especially in the Southeast (Sealaska) Region, already are
surrounded by state-selected acreage.
249
In 1971 Interior Secretary Morton told Congress that federal
land selections in Alaska had been "fairly well" made; the process
has not yet been completed, however, after nearly a decade.250
Federal land managers are caught between environmentalists, who
advocate extensive federal land withdrawals for parks and wildlife
"in the national interest" and the "benefit of all Americans," and
the State of Alaska itself urging a tight ceiling on withdrawals of
commercially developable acreage. 25 1  Responding angrily to
suggestions that the State would do a poor job of conserving
resources, Alaska Congressman Begich offered "two reasons" why
most land should be placed in state hands: "[one,] the fact that we
have Native people there who have shown us the way to proper
conservation, and two, because we have fled from the south 48 to a
245. FINAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 497-98. See Hearings on the Implementation of the Alaska Native
Claims SettlementAct, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
246. 1974 Hearing, supra note 239, at 4, 27, 113.
247. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 13-16, 30-32, 51. For example, the Bureau of Land
Management wanted Easements for 15,000 of the 23,040 acres selected by the village of Kake. Id. at
41, 72.
248. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 30. There were numerous complaints that the
Interior Department was holding up patents until native corporations agreed to overgenerous federal
easements. Id. at 53, 57-58, 59, 68.
249. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 483-93, 497, 534, 546.
250. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 282. The federal literature on national
interest land selections is extensive. See, e.g., Hearing on the Status af Federal lands in Alaska, Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974); Hearings on Alaska National
Interest Lands, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
In 1980 Congress acted to accelerate the land selection and patenting process. Most of the
selection is now complete. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980). See S. REP. No. 96-413, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
251. Eg., 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 322-23, 328, 340; FINAL REPORT,
supra note 242, at 499, 501.
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State that has fresh air to sell some of you people." 252
Delay in completing federal selections indirectly jeopardizes
Native land selections. Native lands in many cases will be
surrounded by federal withdrawals, and restrictions on the use of
the federal land may affect Natives' use of their land. The problem
is plainest in areas chiefly valuable for standing timber. If Native
corporations are unable to obtain rights-of-way through adjacent
federal park and wildlife lands, they will be unable to harvest
timber commercially. Moreover, section 22 of ANCSA requires
that Native lands located within national park or wildlife
withdrawals be managed compatibly.
3. Taxation of Native Lands
Section 21 of ANCSA immunizes Native lands from property
taxation for twenty years. Most settlement lands remained
unpatented a decade after ANCSA's enactment, leading many
Native organizations to fear that villages will be forced to sell
partially developed lands for taxes when the tax exemption
expires. 25 3 Some propose amending ANCSA to measure the
twenty-year tax exemption from the date the land is patented
2 54
others, noting that many village lands were selected for subsistence
uses and were never intended to generate cash income, advocate a
permanent tax immunity. 25 5 "If we lose the land, we lose
everything. Natives can't stay Natives without the land; they'd just
be money-managers. "256
4. Alienability of Shares
In 1991 ANCSA's twenty-year restriction on alienability of
Native corporations' shares will end. "When the restrictions on
alienation of their stock expire, the Native corporations will be
sitting ducks for corporate raiders," an American Indian Policy
Review Commission report concluded, and "even successful and
profitable Native corporations will likely be vulnerable because
their shareholders will not appreciate their rights and the dividends
252. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 339.
253. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 32-33, 57, 65-67, 71, 74, 77, 80, 84, 87. As of 1980,
about one-fourth of the settlement's 40,000,000 acres have been conveyed to natives. See Hunter,
Native Regional Corporations: Prosperity is Elusivefor Some, in ALASKA INDUS. 19 (Jan. 1980).
254. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 25-26, 29, 32, 74, 76.
255. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 18, 47, 55, 68-69, 77, 79, 83. On the other hand,
some natives have opposed a tax exemption arguing that they "would definitely have social
problems'" as a result because they "wouldn't be equal. " Id. at 69, 83, 87.
256. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 34.
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they receive." ' 257 Delays in land patenting will make ANCSA
corporations particularly attractive. Rich with newly acquired land
but not yet paying substantial dividends, they will seem to be worth
more to native stockholders for their liquidation or sell-off value
than as going concerns. The likelihood of absorption by asset-
hungry multinational corporations has prompted some Native
leaders to rethink their prior opposition to trust status and
reservations, and to advocate amendment of ANCSA to render
shares permanently inalienable.
258
5. Overlapping Local Organizations
Some 255 Native villages incorporated under ANCSA, mostly
for-profit, but 70 villages already were organized as constitutional
tribal governments under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act
(I.R.A.), and 84 had incorporated as Alaska State municipalities
under a 1963 BIA policy. 25 9 At least half also preserved some form
of traditional village government. In many villages, then, tribal,
municipal, and corporate bodies share jurisdiction and
responsibility for the same community. Problems arise because
their powers and constituencies overlap but are neither identical
nor coordinated.
In the finance area, for example, only ANCSA village
corporations may share settlement lands and revenues, but tribal
governments are eligible for various federal grants-in-aid, and
municipalities exercise general taxing powers. 260 Land is owned by
the village corporation and the municipality, if any, but land-use
jurisdiction is shared by the municipality and the tribal
government. Generally, most wealth is in corporation hands, most
jurisdiction and service-delivery responsibility in municipal and
tribal hands. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that some
natives ineligible for village corporation shareholdership under
ANCSA are voting members of the I.R.A. tribal organization;
other natives are shareholders but do not meet I.R.A. councils'
membership criteria; and both natives and nonnatives may vote in
municipal elections. 261 Voluntary cooperation among village-level
257. FINAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 499, 502; TASK FORCE REPORT, sUpra note 236, at 48, 69,
71, 74, 78, 88. See also Price, Region-Village Relations under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 5
U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 58, 256 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Price, Region-Village Relations].
258. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 19-20, 25-26, 66.
259. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 24, 47. See Price, Region-Village Relations, supra note
257, at 60.
260. In Hoonah, Nome, and Klukwan, for example, at least half of all residents are non-Native.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 41-42, 59.
261. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 495, 501; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 21-
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bodies is difficult to achieve because each contains, to some degree,
a constituency not shared with the others.
Native dissatisfaction with ANCSA has prompted attempts to
strengthen tribal government in Alaska and prevent conflict
between ANCSA and non-ANSCA organizations. 262 As long as
wealth and public responsibility remain segregated, however,
ANCSA's overlay of local corporations on preexisting village
structure may breed continuing conflicts and hinder the effective
investment of settlement resources in Native communities'
economies.
6. Village-Region Conflicts
Village corporations and regional corporations are separate
organizations with constituencies that overlap only to a small
degree. Each corporation is subject to the "duty to profit" and
must make its own investments, but regional corporations retain a
degree of governmental, supervisory authority over village
corporations that invites conflicts of interest. 63 A regional
corporation can exercise its ANCSA powers to review village land
transactions, approve village expenditures from settlement funds,
and compel villages to participate in joint ventures to benefit all
regional stockholders at particular villages' expense. 264 Since
regional corporations own minerals beneath village lands, with
access guaranteed expressly by ANCSA, a region's efforts to
explore and develop minerals could entirely defeat village plans for
protecting subsistence or renewable-resource economies. 26
5
What is worse, "many of the village corporations have found
that they are too small to effectively manage their resources and
responsibilities under the provisions of ANCSA, ' ' 266 a problem
aggravated by village dependence on the Region's approval,
cooperation and financing for key decisions. Several regions have
pursued a policy of aggressively absorbing villages, and a 1976
amendment to ANCSA facilitates village-region mergers. 267 The
amendment's supporters considered the disappearance of separate
24. In Saxman, for instance, the state-organized borough government taxes but does not serve; the
city ofSaxman serves but relies entirely upon federal grants-in-aid for financing. Id. at 38.
262. S. REP. No. 2046, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
263. See generally Branson, Square Pegs in Round Holes: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Corporations
under Corporate law, 8 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REv. 103 (1979); Price, A Moment in History, supra note
222, at 98.
264. Price, Region- Village R lationships, supra note 257, at 63-68, 71, 75-76, 240-46.
265. Price, Region- Village Relationships, supra note 257, at 251-55.
266. Hearing on Amendments to Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior
andInsularA [fairs, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 21 (1975).
267. Pub. L. No. 204, 89 Stat. 1149 (1976); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 58.
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village organizations inevitable and appropriate. "Regardless of
what village in the region they may be from and which village
corporation they may be stockholders in," Alaska Senator Ted
Stevens argued, "they view themselves all being united as part of
the region, and their main interest is the survival of the region as a
whole and of the regional corporation.' '268 Widespread mergers
will alienate all ANCSA management further from individual
Natives, however, and villagers will lose any direct control over
village land.
7. Conflict Among Regions
As for-profit business corporations, ANCSA regions are
implicitly in conflict over a limited number of attractive investment
opportunities. Unavoidably, they are competitors. ANCSA's
provision for sharing mineral revenues among regions has
intensified this competition significantly. Section 7(i) of the
settlement fails to specify whether the revenue shared is to be gross
or net, and if net, what expenses are allowable in determining net
revenue. This has led mineral rich regions to conceal income or
take income in the form of intangibles, and triggered lawsuits by
mineral poor regions. 269 "Legal and accounting fees arising from
discord over the section's interpretation and application are
consuming an astonishing portion of the cash flow of all twelve
regional corporations," the Alaska Native Foundation reported. 2
7 0
Resolution of problems of interpretation nevertheless cannot
resolve section 7(i)'s essential irrationality: requiring regional
corporations to share seventy percent of their mineral income is a
disincentive to mineral development and encourages sale of
mineral lands to non-ANCSA developers.
8. Elites and Value Conflicts
During the 1971 congressional hearings on proposals for
settlement, the Alaska State Chamber of Commerce paradoxically
warned the Senate against cursing Natives with "corporate
bureaucracy. ",271 Curse or no, a polarization of cultures within the
Alaska Native world is evident. "By legislative stroke, the Congress
converted all Alaska Natives into members of the corporate world,
268. Hearing on Amendments to Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, supra note 266, at 35.
269. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 16-17, 29, 54; FINAL REPORT, supra note 242, at
500.
270. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 28.
271. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 508.
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receivers of annual reports, proxy statements, solicitations and
balance sheets. The Native received a shotgun initiation into the
American mainstream. "272 "Village values will be transformed
into western corporate values," the Alaska Native Foundation
predicts. "[Clorporate executive leadership will replace traditional
leadership," accomplishing what "education and religion have
failed to do after one hundred years. "273
Among the executive elite, at least, "the gospel of capitalism
has gripped the leadership of the regional corporations just as in
another day, another kind of gospel was introduced for its
educative and assimilative influence. The profitmaking mandate
has become a powerful vision, a powerful driving force. "274 Native
managers can be found boasting of "becom[ing] influential and
respected in the financial world because of a firm reputation for
reliability, honesty, and integrity in business matters" and urging
their constituents to abandon "non-employment or 'make-work'
employment [for] responsible participation in the free enterprise
system. ''275 Wholeheartedly embracing the new gods, they
advocate the "filter-down" theory of social welfare. "The
Corporation is not directly involved in the administration of social
type programs and does not anticipate using its funds in this area,"
Sealaska advised its shareholders; "however, initiating or
acquiring profitable enterprises . . . will improve the regional
economic climate, provide employment and generate profits. ",276
"The yardstick by which we measure proposals," the Aleut
corporation explains, "is their demonstrated ability to outperform
the predictable, riskless investment of simply keeping our money in
an interest bearing bank account. "277 According to another
ANSCA corporation, the settlement "mandates that one way of life
must die so that another can live. "278
NANA Regional Corporation likened the problem of survival
in the business world to traditional challenges, choosing the
following as its corporate logo:
Eskimo hunter moving aggressively toward a successful
future in a vast, beautiful, and sometimes harsh
world. . . .NANA is all of us together as one hunter,
272. Price, A Moment in History, supra note 222, at 95 (footnote omitted).
273. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 34.
274. Price, A Moment in History, supra note 222, at 100 (footnote omitted).
275. ARTIC SLOPE REGIONAL CORP., ANNUAL REP. 2 (1976).
276. SEALASKA CORP., ANNUAL REP. 2 (1975).
277. ALEUT CORP., ANNUAL REP. 2 (1974). See BRISTOL BAY NATIVE CORP., ANNUAL REP.
(1975); SEALASKA CORP., ANNUAL REP. (1976).
278. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 63.
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successful if we are of mind and purpose, hungry if we are
split by doubts and mistrust of each other. As one hunter
is small and insignificant when compared to our
environment so is NANA when compared to the
corporate and governmental environment in which it
must hunt successfully to survive. The same qualities of
courage, confidence, humility, respect, integrity, and
sharing with others that have allowed our people to
survive as great hunters in a harsh climate are necessary
for NANA to be successful.
27 9
Like most other ANCSA corporations, however, NANA has
struggled over whether the profit standard truly is in Native
stockholders' best interest. Since dividends thus far have been low
or nonexistent and most stockholders reside within their own
region, employment tends to have a more direct, beneficial effect
on individuals. Consequently, all but the two regions with the
greatest proportion of nonresident shareholders, Cook Inlet and
Sealaska, have tended to invest locally and to regard Native
employment as at least a secondary objective.280 For example, the
Aleut corporation's "primary criteria" in prioritizing investments
is "profitability," but "consideration also will be given to
employment and experience opportunities for our stock-
holders. "281 "Before any Calista Corporation investments are
made, thought is given to employment opportunities for our
shareholders," and "[miost of [NANA's] operations are labor
intensive in order to provide jobs for our shareholders. "282
A Native corporation "should provide more to its shareholders
than a normal business," Sealaska officers admit. "[Y]our
management should concentrate its attention on matters of
business, but as we build we should not lose sight of who we are and
why we are working together in this common purpose. ''283 Cook
Inlet (CIRI) considers it a matter of corporate "policy to maintain
a strong position of advocacy with regard to the social well-being of
its stockholders," and one Bristol Bay village corporation argues
279. NANA REGIONAL CORP., ANNUAL REP. (1974).
280. Computed from corporate annual reports. Many village corporations report pressure to
make a profit or liquidate, rather than to invest in job formation, coming from nonresident (or "at-
large") shareholders. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 59, 61.
281. ALEUT CORP., ANNUAL REP. 2 (1973); ALEUT CORP. ANNUAL REP. 5 (1974). See TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 236, at 61.
282. CALISTA CORP., ANNUAL REP. 10 (1976); NANA REGIONAL CORP., ANNUAL REP. (1975).
See BRISTOL BAY NATURE CORP., ANNUAL REP. (1976); CooK INLET REGION, INC., ANNUAL REP.
(1974); NANA REGIONAL CORP., ANNUAL REP. (1974). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236,
at 58.
283. SEALASKA CORP., ANNUAL REP. 2 (1978); SEALASKA CORP., ANNUAL REP. 2 (1976).
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that good management "recognizes . ..non-economic values and
gives them equal weight in the decision process.' '284 Furthermore,
"although their corporate goals do not always coincide with the
continued subsistence lifestyle of their stockholders, most of the
corporations have a moral commitment to protecting subsistence
hunting and fishing rights" when they conflict with land
development. 285 Nonetheless, profit is an issue that may, and often
has torn regions apart. Nonresidents and conventionally employed
natives may view shareownership as nothing more than an
opportunity for extra unearned cash income, while villagers,
especially those engaged in subsistence pursuits, must rely now on
the same corporations to protect their renewable resource base and
finance community services. The boardroom is the battleground
for two incompatible cultures, and the evidence is in unusually
frequent board turnovers, proxy fights, and derivative actions.
286
Native groups may not self-destruct, but traditional villages may
find themselves isolated, reacting to supervision by Native
executives as once they resisted assimilation pressure from the
BIA, and with fewer resources than they had before ANCSA.
E. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Noting the Alaska Federation of Natives' estimate that 80 to
120 million acres would be needed simply to maintain existing
village subsistence economies, the Interior Department candidly
predicted a decade ago that regional corporation dividends would
level off at about $400 per shareholder, "forc[ing] them on the
welfare rolls.' '281 It is indeed difficult to imagine how a capital fund
of $1,000,000,000 reasonably could generate more than $1,000 or
$2,000 annually for each of some 100,000 Native shareholders. Any
significant contribution of Native corporations to shareholders'
well-being must depend upon the lands as yet not entirely conveyed
by the United States.
Corporate financial performance in ANCSA's first decade has
not been stellar. (Appendix 5). Although two or three have posted
healthy gains at respectable profit margins, the net status of Native
wealth is a loss. If the regional corporations were liquidated today,
Natives could anticipate only about $1,000 per capita in net
284. COOK INLET REGION, INC., ANNUAL REP. (1975): TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at
63.
285. See McKinney, Native Firms Again Facing Land Issues, ALASKA INDUS. 23, 27 (July 1977). See
also DOYON, LTD., ANNUAL REP. (1976).
286. See Hunter, supra note 253, at 19.
287. See 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 324-25.
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proceeds, to add to the roughly equal amount distributed to Natives
directly since 1971 under the settlement's revenue sharing
requirements. This does not include the value of land ownership,
but while completion of land conveyances will boost net book
values considerably, the annual earnings picture must improve lest
the combination of strong assets and weak dividends target the
regional corporations for takeover bids.
Most Native boards identify the legal and administrative costs
of ANCSA itself as their principal obstacles, and predict strong
growth after the settlement's "startup" period. 2 8  The Act's
uncertainties and regulatory complexity undoubtedly contributed
to poor corporate performance, but other factors must share
responsibility. Several regionals were carried away with the
pipeline boom economy, investing heavily in related construction
and services. Completion of the pipeline and the resulting wind-
down in demand for materials, transport, and transient housing
was a severe blow. At the same time, mineral exploration around
the State has been accelerating while the regionals await conveyance
of their settlement lands, effectively isolating Native enterprise from
the State's major growth industry. Regionality - an investment
focus on regional, labor intensive activities - increases
corporations' risk by preventing diversification. Most Native
corporations concentrate on one or two related sectors for
investment. (Appendix 4). Although the payoff in Native
employment may be great enough to improve resident
shareholders' loyalty,2 89 this off-the-balance-sheet gain will not
mollify nonresidents or reduce the danger of bankruptcy from
sectoral collapse under changing economic conditions.
Unless a substantial proportion of settlement lands are
reconveyed to individual Natives or are presented for individual
subsistence, a policy issue not yet resolved by ANCSA
corporations, Natives will be left in 1991 with little or no private
capital. Their only property will be corporate equity, and that can
do no more than pay dividends - the equivalent of welfare in this
instance. Through ANCSA, the United States has experimented,
in practical effect, with delegating the transfer-payment job from
the public sector to the private sector. Natives dissatisfied with
288. ALEUT CORP., ANNUAL REP. (1976); COOK INLET REGION, INC., ANNUAL REPS. (1974-
1976); DOYON, LTD., ANNUAL REPS. (1976, 1978); NANA REGIONAL CORP., ANNUAL REP. (1975);
SEALASKA CORP., ANNUAl REP. (1975).
289. NANA Regional Corporation, for example, employs 60% Native stockholders. But with a
total of 303 corporate employees, this means that only roughly one in twenty employable adult
NANA natives work for their own ANCSA corporation. See NANA REGIONAL CORP., ANNUAl REP.
(1978).
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annual dividends as their principal source of cash income will have
no choice but to capitalize by selling their shares. The imperative of
liquidation will be particularly keen ifANCSA corporations' profit-
seeking leads them to develop subsistence lands by mining,
subdivision, and forestry, such that dividends become many
shareholders' only income source.
F. EFFECT ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND CLAIMS
Finality was a priority when Congress agreed on ANCSA, but
the settlement's actual effect on tribal existence and claims is far
from being resolved. For example, nothing in ANCSA expressly
relates village corporations to preexisting tribal governments
operating under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, resulting in
suggestions that ANCSA implicitly repealed the earlier law.
290 If
anything, however, villages regard ANCSA as a challenge to
rejuvenate long-dormant I.R.A. tribal councils.
291
Many parties to the settlement unquestionably contemplated
termination of Alaska Natives' special political status. Senate
supporters promised that the "settlement will with minor
exceptions put an end to racial or ethnic distinctions in land tenure
or hunting and fishing rights, "292 and section 2(c) of the law
declares as its purpose "maximum participation by Natives in
decisions affecting their rights and property and without
establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights,
privileges, or obligations, without creating a reservation system or
lengthy wardship or trusteeship, or and without adding to . . .
special tax privileges... ",293 In supporting ANCSA, Alaska
Governor Egan expressed his "need to assure that Alaskans remain
one people," and noting widespread Native migration to Alaskan
urban areas in recent years, Interior Secretary Morton and
southeast regional Native spokesman, John Borbridge, agreed that
the "challenge is to utilize these trends . . . rather than try to
obstruct or halt them" through the settlement. 
294
290. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 236, at 52.
291. See, e.g., CRAIG COMMUNITY I.R.A. NEWSLETTER (Craig, Alaska).
292. S. REP. No. 405, supra note 182, at 286, 358.
293. Pub. L. No. 92-203, § 2(c), 85 Stat. 688 (1976) (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
1981)).
294. 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearin4 , supra note 181, at 286, 358.
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[T]he essence of a tribe is its legitimate claim to some
political authority. By choosing the corporate form,
Congress has negated this claim to political authority. A
corporation is an owner of assets and a manager of assets.
It has no authority over personal conduct or behavior,
and, without specific statutory aids, has no governing
power to control what kind of development or subsistence
activity occurs within its sphere of influence. 
295
Some Alaska Native groups did indeed initially regard the
settlement proposal as "terminationist," but were persuaded to
throw their support to the more moderate Harris-Kennedy plan. 296
Fears of termination were revived after ANCSA implementation
began, leading the American Indian Policy Review Commission in
1977 to advise Congress that the special political status of Alaska
Natives had survived the settlement. 297 judging from the growth in
federal grants-in-aid to Native villages' tribal councils over the past
decade, Congress and the Administration share the Commission's
view. As a political settlement, then, ANCSA merely increased the
variety and wealth of Native organizations.
ANCSA was little more successful in bringing closure toNative
claims for land, resource rights, and damages for historical
trespass. Although section 4(a) of the law declares it to be a "full
and final settlement" of all claims based on land use or ownership,
its application to offshore marine and coastal rights, among others,
remains unclear.
298
V. THE EASTERN CLAIMS
A. AN INDEPENDENT LEGAL THEORY
Now, for how many years have we been saying that the
Indians ought to get into the political process and the
legal process, and once they are in it they get screwed up
against the wall. 9 9
About the time that Congress began serious consideration of
an Alaskan settlement, a new round of tribal land claims attracted
295. See Price, A Moment in History, supra note 222, at 96 (footnote omitted).
296, 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 544.
297. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 500-01, 502.
298 1971 Alaska Native Claims Hearing, supra note 181, at 345, 561-63.
299, 6 MEETINGS OF THE AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM. 170 (1977) (remarks of Sen. james
Abourezk, Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs),
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national attention. Tribes along the eastern seaboard for the most
part had treaty relations with Great Britain and its colonies before
American independence. Some agreed to the establishment of
reservations within British jurisdiction; others remained relatively
aloof and consented only to the barest alliances of convenience .
3
00
During the revolutionary conflict and under the new republic's first
charter, the Articles of Confederation, each state governed
relations with tribes already within its territory and jurisdiction,
and the national legislature dealt with external tribes as foreign
nations. 30 1 Disputes among the states over whether particular tribes
were "within" one or another local jurisdiction soon revealed the
impracticality of the Articles' plan.30 2 The new Constitution of
1789 referred all power to treat and to "regulate Commerce . . .
with the Indian Tribes" to Congress.
30 3
In 1790 Congress adopted a comprehensive system of
commercial regulation that required travellers in tribal territory to
be licensed by federal authority and, carrying into effect specific
agreements with the great eastern tribal confederacies, prescribed
penalties for American citizens' crimes against tribal citizens in
tribal communities. 30 4 It also provided that no sale of lands made
by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United
States, should be valid unless it was made and duly executed at
some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States.
Neither a private deed executed by individual Indians nor an
agreement between a tribe and a state executed without federal
sanction could pass lawful title. Most eastern seaboard tribes
nevertheless sold land to the states after 1790 without federal
participation or approval. Other tribal lands were lost when state
authorities unilaterally declared Indians "paupers" or wards and
conveyed their lands to non-Indian trustees for development and
300. See Barsh, Native American Loyalists and Patriots, in 10(3) INDIAN HISTORIAN 9 (1977).
301. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation provided that "[tihe united states in congress
assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of. . regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members afany of the states, provided that the legislative right
of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX
(emphasis added).
302. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 548 (M. Farrand ed. 1911); 2.1.
KENNEDY, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM WIRT 241 (rev. ed. 1850).
303. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
304. Act of.July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (current version at 25 U.S.C.A. 5 177 (West
1963)). Although only the Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Shawnees, Wyandots, Six Nations,
and the Creeks agreed to United States criminal jurisdiction within their boundries, the Act of 1790
prescribed federal penalties for conduct against citizens of "any nation or tribe of Indians." Id.
(emphasis added). This later was interpreted as an implicit extension of jurisdiction over non-
consenting tribes-perhaps to save the courts the trouble of referral to individual tribal treaties. See
Barsh, Kennedy's Criminal Code Reform Bill and What It Doesn't Do For the Tribes, 6(3) AM.
INDIAN.J. 2, 3 (Mar. 1980); Barsh & Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the
Huntinga ofthe Snark, 63 MINN. L. REv. 609, 624-25 (1979).
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sale. 305
Claims based upon state and private violations of the 1790
Trade and Intercourse Act did not fall clearly within the
jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission, because the United
States was not the principal wrongdoer. Had eastern tribes
complained of federal seizures of lands guaranteed by treaty, for
example, they would have found their way barred by the Indian
Claims Commission Act's requirement that all claims against the
United States be brought within five years (1946-1951). Instead,
they argued that the Trade and Intercourse Act made the United
States a trustee of tribal lands and, as trustee, the United States
now was responsible for claiming unlawfully deeded land from
states and their citizens. Federal action against private parties
would not be limited by any theory of sovereign immunity, and the
applicable statute of limitations would not run out until 1972.306
The Department of Justice has resisted involvement in Trade
and Intercourse Acts suits, reflecting an Administration policy to
avoid resolving eastern claims until the development of some
comprehensive settlement policy. 307 "We also are trying in terms of
dollars that we support for these claims to make sure that [they] are
not handled in a way that puts them out of step, if you will, with all
of the various other Western land claims that have been settled
through the Indian Claims Commission," Interior Department
Solicitor Leo Krulitz told Congress in 1979.308 The
Administration's fear of reopening the western cases amounts to an
admission that western tribes were underpaid, and a determination
that underpayment of eastern tribes will be necessary to protect the
finality of prior settlements.
B. THE MAINE SETTLEMENT: SELF-TERMINATION
The first eastern claim to be prosecuted and the most
successful in terms of dollars, was initiated in 1972 by the
Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribes of Maine. According to the
305. See Barsh, supra note 300, at 9. See also W. APES, INDIAN NULLIFICATION OF THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS (1835).
306. See, e.g., Andrade v. United States, 485 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831
(1974), Six Nations Confederacy v. Andrus, 447 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1977), qff'd, 610 F.2d 996
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980). This does not mean, of course, that a legislative
deadline that has the effect of writing off otherwise meritorious claims is constitutional without
compensation; it may constitute a taking. See H. R. REP. No. 1453, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1948 [hereinafter cited as H. R. REP. No. 1453]
(comments of Interior Solicitor Krulitz).
307. See Hearing on the Mashpee Lands, Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 25, 40 (1977).
308. See Hearing: Settlement of the Catawba Indian Land Claims, Before the House Comm. on Interior and
InsularAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979).
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tribes, 12,500,000 acres worth more than $25,000,000,000 had
been acquired by the State and its citizens in violation of
the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. Since the land never had
been acquired lawfully, the tribes demanded repossession rather
than compensation. Failing to persuade the Administration to file
suit on their behalf, the tribes successfully brought an action
against the Secretary of the Interior, as "trustee," to compel his
cooperation. 30 9 In 1977 the Attorney General agreed to sue the
State of Maine for tribal lands, but refused to join small private
landowners as defendants on the grounds that they were
"completely innocent of any wrongdoing. "310
Pendency of the suit threw a cloud on title over a large part of
the state and impaired municipalities' ability to float revenue
bonds, 31' resulting in congressional and Presidential pressure for a
prompt, negotiated settlement. In 1977 the tribes and the State
rejected a Presidential mediator's suggestion of 25,000,000 federal
dollars and 100,000 acres of state lands in satisfaction of tribal
claims. A proposal for $50,500,000 and 300,000 acres to be
acquired for $5.00 per acre at federal expense was rejected the
following year. Acknowledging that further litigation, even if
successful, would cost at least $1,000,000 and jeopardize land
transactions for five or more years, Maine State Attorney General
Richard Cohen won state agreement to a third compromise plan
and, in 1980, a tribal-state agreement was submitted for
congressional approval.
31 2
The "Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act" ratifies all land
transactions previously made in that State in contravention of the
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act.3 13 As compensation, tribes may
use $54,500,000 to purchase 300,000 acres,3 1 4 and the income from
a $27,000,000 trust fund for other purposes. Neither fund is to be
considered in determining the eligibility of the State, tribes, or
tribal members for federal financial assistance. The Secretary of the
Interior manages both funds and supervises the tribes' purchase,
development, and use of reacquired lands. No part of the cost of
309..Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
For a general history of this case, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 542-44.
310. Letter from At'y Gen. Griffin Bell to Sec. of the Interior Cecil D. Andrus, reprinted in S.
REP. No. 569, 96th Cong., 2d Session 13 (1980). Most of the claim area, however, was woodland
owned by a few pulp and paper companies. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 542.
311. Address by State Att'y Gen. Richard S. Cohen to the Legislature of the State of Maine
(Mar. 18, 1980) (regarding the proposed Maine Indian land claims se'_tlement) (unpublished
transcript). See FINAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 542-44.
312. See Address by State Att'y Gen. Richard S. Cohen, supra note 311.
313. Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Pub. L. No. 96-460 (signed Oct. 10, 1980).
314. Section 9 of Public Law 460 exempts sellers from the federal capital gains tax, which
effectively increases the purchasing power of the settlement's $54,500,000 land acquisition fund by
25 %. Id. 9.
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settlement is borne by the State, on the theory that past state
expenditures for the benefit and support of the tribes were
substantial and gratuitous.
3 15
At first blush, this settlement for the equivalent of
approximately $25,000 and 275 acres per capita appears generous
compared to the results of Indian Claims Commission Act
litigation. The Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribes paid a
considerable political price, however, agreeing in exchange for
compensation to place themselves for most purposes under state
governance and jurisdiction. "Except as otherwise provided" by
the State's claims settlement implementing act, "all Indians, Indian
nations, and tribes and bands of Indians in the State and any lands
or other natural resources owned by them .. shall be subject to the
laws of the State and to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the
courts of the State to the same extent as any other person or lands
or other natural resources therein." 31 6 The tribes reserve exclusive
legislative authority and jurisdiction only over "internal tribal
matters" such as membership, tribal government organization,
and the "right to reside" on tribally owned lands. Tribal courts
retain original forum jurisdiction over juvenile matters, domestic
relations, and small claims involving only tribal members, but
must apply Maine laws. Tribal authority to regulate hunting and
fishing is subject to state approval, and may not discriminate
against nonmembers. On all other matters, tribes have the same
legislative powers as Maine's non-tribal municipalities, but must
prosecute ordinance violations by nonmembers in state courts.
Reacquired lands are subject to state taxes, although there can
be no foreclosure for nonpayment. Reacquired lands can be lost by
the State's exercise of eminent domain when there is no
"reasonably feasible alternative," however, leaving the affected
tribe two years to apply any compensation to the purchase of sub-
stitute acreage. Tribes' sovereign immunity is waived in effect,
if not in principle, by provision for paying money claims against the
tribes out of the settlement trust fund. 3 17 As explained by Maine
Attorney General Cohen, the settlement plan is "based on the
principle that all Maine laws must apply to all lands and citizens
within the State and that we all must live under one system of law
which governs us all. 3 "18 As such, that settlement gained for the
315. Id. S 2(a) (10).
316. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, S 6204 (West Supp, 1981).
317. Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Pub. L. No. 96-460 (signed Oct. 10, 1980). If a tribe
refuses to pay state taxes, for example, the state may recover the tax debt from the settlement fund.
See id. S 6(c).
318. Statement of State Att'y Gen. Richard S. Cohen, supra note 311, at 14-15.
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State a measure of control over Indian lands unlike that in any
other state.
Under the Maine implementing act, then, tribes function as
somewhat limited municipalities, since they have enforcement
jurisdiction only over tribal members. Their authority exceeds that
of state-incorporated cities and towns only to the extent of denying
residence and electoral franchise to nonmembers. On the whole,
tribes no longer are territorial sovereigns more or less on a par with
the states. Instead, they are similar to state subdivisions, with the
unique power to restrict immigration. If the tribes' object in
pursuing land claims was financial, the settlement was a
resounding success in comparison with most other tribes'
experience. If, however, Maine tribes had a political and social
culture to preserve through the exercise of self-government, then
the settlement must be considered a defeat. In the 1950's, tribes
such as the Menominee bitterly fought federal efforts to convert
them from self-governing tribes to state counties or municipalities,
and in recent years Congress reluctantly has restored some
"terminated" tribes' special political status. 319 The Maine tribes,
on the contrary, terminated themselves for a price, as did Alaska
Native bands and villages under ANCSA. It would seem that
Congress's theory of employing claims settlements to disperse and
assimilate Indians, however unsuccessful under the Indian Claims
Commission Act, has proved occasionally correct in recent years. It
may justly be asked, however, whether ANCSA and the Maine
settlement will come apart over time as compensation funds run
out, land is lost, and a new generation of tribal members evaluates
coldly in retrospect the tradeoffs of cash and self-determination that
their parents have made.
C. THE RHODE ISLAND SETTLEMENT: AN ANCSA HYBRID
Less dramatic than the Maine litigation, but resolved two
years earlier, Narragansett tribal claims to lands in the City of
Charlestown, Rhode Island led to settlement legislation that
Congress hoped would become a "model" for eastern land
disputes. In 1880 the State purchased 3,200 acres of Narragansett
territory without federal approval, in violation of the Indian Trade
and Intercourse Act. 320 A 1976 federal action by the tribe for
319. Hearings: Menominee Restoration Act, Before the Subcomm. qf Indian Affairs of House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See FREEDOM WITH RESERVATION: THE
MENOMINEE STRUGGLE TO SAVE THEIR LAND AND PEOPLE (D. Shames ed. 1972). See also Orfield, in
6(1) CIVIL RIGHTS DIGEST 35 (1973).
320. See H. R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 306, at 6, 8.
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repossession resulted in "severe economic hardships from the
clouding of land titles" in Charlestown, prompting negotiation
among state, city, and tribal representatives.321
The settlement agreement and congressional implementing
act "follo[w] the precedent set in the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act ... by providing the Indians with an opportunity to
acquire a viable land base in the process of resolving their claims to
aboriginal lands." ' 32 2 The State contributes 900 acres worth
$2,700,000 to the settlement, and the United States appropriates
$3,500,000 to purchase another 900 acres from pri-
vate landowners.3 2 3 In imitation of ANCSA, the land is to be
held, not by the existing tribal organization, but by an "Indian
corporation" with an Indian-majority board of directors. The
corporation is not legally a tribe and is ineligible to receive federal
protection or financial assistance; its sole function is to regulate use
of the settlement tract under a plan agreed to by the State. Most of
the tract is reserved for conservation (for practical purposes, a state
park) with tribal hunting and fishing permitted elsewhere. All state
laws apply to the reacquired tract, but it remains exempt from state
taxes. 324
Unlike the Passamaquoddies and Penobscots, the
Narragansetts had long since ceased to function as a territorial
tribal government and had less apparent reason to avoid state
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is difficult to regard the Rhode Island
settlement as more than a moral victory. Private landowners
threatened by the tribal suit lose nothing; if they choose to sell, they
sell at the generous average price of $35,000 per acre of land and
improvements. The State gives up direct control of undeveloped
land to a state-organized nonprofit corporation, but development
of the tract is severely limited. The tribe acquires a park-like
historic area with limited management opportunities. As in both
ANCSA and the Maine settlement, the economic outcome will
depend more upon control of land use than sheer acreage. If state
and tribal land use objectives differ, state plans generally govern. If
state laws frustrate tribal objectives, tribal members probably will
seek liquidation, preferring ready cash to paper ownership of land
they cannot use. The result will be to restore the pre-settlement
status quo.
321. Narragansett Tribe v. Southern Rhode Island Land Development Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798
(D.R.!. 1976). See H. R. REP. No. 1453 supra note 306, at 8, 15.
322. See H. R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 306, at 8.
323.25 U.S.C.A. § 1701-1712 (Supp. 1980).
324. H. R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 306, at 6-9, 16.
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D. PENDING SETTLEMENTS: MASHPEE AND CATAWBA
Other eastern claims under the Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act still await resolution. One of the most interesting involves
Mashpee, originally a colonial Indian reservation and "praying
town" that lost and then regained limited self-government in a
widely publicized early nineteenth century controversy. 32 5 In 1870
Massachusetts organized a town at Mashpee and control of land
and local affairs shifted from Indian to non-Indian hands. Federal
approval for the State's assimilation of the Mashpee community
was lacking, and on this ground Mashpee descendants filed suit
against present-day landowners for possession.
While the initial phases of the lawsuit were pending,
Massachusetts Senators Brooke and Kennedy sought congressional
intervention. "[I]f there is a wrong," Brooke argued, "then it is a
wrong which has been committed by the Federal Government and
not by the people of the town of Mashpee .... We have to save the
town and the property rights, and even the Indians understand
this.'' 31 2 6 Citing the suit's chilling effect on land sales and
development and the town's refusal to give up any undeveloped
tracts,3 27 Brooke and Kennedy suggested two legislative
alternatives. Congress and the State might share the cost of an
immediate cash settlement, "gambling a small stake to avoid the
risk of later being required to pay a far larger sum, should the tribe
ultimately prevail.' '328 Tribal representatives were not impressed
with the generosity or constitutionality of Brooke's proposal to
extinguish Indian claims to land worth $200,000,000 in exchange
for $4,000,000 in compensation. They were even less impressed by
the Administration's suggestion that the $4,000,000 fund be paid
only if Mashpee descendants won their lawsuit, arguing that such a
limitation on the court's ability to fix compensation would violate
the fifth amendment.
3 29
The second alternative was for Congress simply to extinguish
tribal claims, at least against individual homeowners. This exercise
of eminent domain would in turn subject the United States to
liability for compensation under the fifth amendment, forcing the
Mashpee descendants to drop their suit against the town and bring
a fresh suit against the United States in the Court of Claims.
330
325. SeeW. APEs, supra note 305; Barsh, supra note 300.
326. See Hearing on the Mashpee Lands, Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., I st
Sess. 29, 39(1977).
327. Id. at 1, 11-12, 21, 26-27, 59-60, 66.
328. Id. at 25.
329. Id. at 43-44, 46-47, 49-50.
330. Id. at 1-2, 15, 21.
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This was unacceptable to the Administration, however: Office of
Management and Budget spokesman Eliot Cutler explained:
The administration is sensitive to the difficulties caused
by the recent assertion of Indian land claims in many
parts of the United States. We generally have supported
the concept of fair legislative resolutions of legitimate
claims to prevent endless litigation which causes
economic stagnation and hardship and bitterness to and
among the innocent people in communities affected by
such claims . . . . [But this] would set a precedent by,
first, shifting the risk solely to the Federal Government
and, second, exposing the Federal Treasury to potential
liability for these claims.
331
In other words, the government is fearful of litigating Indian land
claims without either the guarantee of state financial contribution
to the cost of settlement, or some protective risk-limiting rule such
as the Indian Claims Commission's measure of damages from the
time of the taking rather than the time of settlement. This implicitly
reiterates Administration awareness of the relative inequities of the
Indian Claims Commission process.
No further action on the Mashpee controversy was taken;
federal courts twice held that Mashpee descendants were not a
"tribe" capable of asserting rights under the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act. 332 A similar decision two years later dismissed the
complaint of Chappaquiddick descendants for lands of their
eighteenth century "praying town" subdivided by Massachusetts
in 1828 and 1851.333
No such disability has hampered prosecution of land claims by
the Oneida Nation of New York334 or the Catawbas of South
Carolina. Like the Maine claims, Catawba claims were brought by
the United States on the tribe's behalf, albeit reluctantly. Urged by
the Administration, Congress in 1979 considered a bill for settling
with South Carolina. 335
House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee Chairman
331. Id. at 40.
332. See Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d
575 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabring Corp., 427 F.
Supp. 899 (D. Mass. 1977).
333. Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915 (ist Cir. 1979).
334. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Oneida Indian Nation
v. City ofOneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
335. See Hearing: Settlement of the Catawba Indian Land Claims, Before the House Comm. on Interior and
InsularAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 15-16, 29-30 (1979).
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Udall dismissed as "obviously ridiculous" compensating the tribe
fully for its 140,000 acres, currently valued at $1,200,000,000.336
He nevertheless was careful to dispel any suggestion that Congress
would or could extinguish the Catawbas' rights without just
compensation. "I think the bill is intended to prod everybody to
negotiate in good faith," Udall explained. "If they do not, the
judges are going to have a field day to decide it. It is going to be
delayed for a decade or two. Land titles will fester. "33 Even with
"prodding," it is questionable whether agreement can be reached.
The United States insists that South Carolina share in the cost of
settlement, as Rhode Island and Alaska have done, but refuses to
participate in any agreement for as much as $200,000,000 ($700
per acre). 338 The State prefers to contribute land rather than cash if
it can retain jurisdiction, but tribal members are split over the
acceptability of state law and the desirability of establishing a
reservation-like area.
339
In general terms, the United States and state governments
appear willing to invest public funds and, in some instances,
undeveloped public lands to protect state citizens from the cost and
risk of defending Indian Trade and Intercourse Act suits. In per
capita terms, the eastern settlements have been considerably larger
than ANCSA or Indian Claims Commission awards. This is
understandable in part because eastern tribes found courts willing
to entertain actions for actual possession of land, not because of any
greater equity on tribes' side, but because the defendants lacked the
defense of sovereign immunity. Compared with the value of lands
lost, however, the price of settlement in the East has been as low as
previous Indian claims awards, roughly one percent of current value. In
at least one respect, eastern settlements have been less generous
than western awards, because the tribes have given up most
vestiges of tribal sovereignty and self-government. This suggests
that tribal litigants are no more, and possibly less confident of court
victories today than they were twenty years ago.
VI. UNRESOLVED TRUST CLAIMS IN THE WEST
In 1966 Congress imposed a six-year statute of limitations on
actions by the United States to recover money damages from
336. Id. at6, 10-11, 13.
337. Id. at 23. See id. at 49-50 (regarding economic hardships experienced by landowners in the
claims area).
338. Id. at 6, 8, 16, 18,21.
339. Id. at 11, 16, 20, 24, 27, 30-32, 37-39.
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private persons.3 40 The limit had nearly run when the Interior
Department concluded that "inadvertently" it might bar suits by
the United States, as "trustee," for injuries to tribal and
reservation lands.3 4 1 There also was concern that courts might
interpret the time limit on federal trust actions to bar suits on the
same claims by the tribes themselves.3 4 These claims would not
have been barred, of course, by the Indian Claims Commission Act
because they involved grievances against states and state citizens,
rather than the United States.
Encouraged by the Administration, Congress extended the
deadline for filing federal trust actions to 1977, anticipating prompt
efforts by the Interior Department to identify, evaluate, and report
to the Attorney General all outstanding tribal claims.
343 The
Department took no action until two months before this five year
extension ran out, and then only to notify tribes of the problem and
request assistance.3 44 Congress accordingly was persuaded to set
the deadline ahead again to April 1, 1980, but again little action
was taken to assess potential lawsuits.3 45 No special funding for the
task was appropriated for the 1978 fiscal year: an appropriation of
$4,000,000 was made for the 1979 fiscal year but never was used
because of a Presidential hiring freeze.3 46 At last Congress
authorized $6,000,000 for the final year of the extension, making it
possible for the Bureau of Indian Affairs to conduct a crash
investigation through the use of private contractors and for the
Justice Department to assign twelve attorneys to case review.
34 7
"From 1972 to 1977," a Senate investigating committee
concluded, "the record of the Department of the Interior in
investigating these claims is spotty at best ... characterized by fits
of 'stop-start' resulting from delay in appropriations; employment
freezes; and then fast-closing deadlines. "348 Through 1979 the
Bureau of Indian Affairs had identified 700 potential claims against
state and private landowners, but in 1979 alone BIA sub-
contractors found an additional 9,000 claims.
3 49 Many tribal
340. 28 U.S.C.A. S 2415 (West 1978 & Supp. 1981). The prevailing opinion appears to be that
this statute of limitations does not apply in actions to quiet title. See S. REP. No. 569, supra note 310,
at 4, 8; 1979 Statute ofLimitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 5-6, 13.
341. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 83, at 11, 220.
342. See 1979 Statute qf Limitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 11, 38.
343. See Pub. L. No. 92-485, 86 Stat. 803 (1977); S. REP. No. 569, supra note 310, at 1-2; 1979
Statute qf Limitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 1.
344. See 1979 Statute of Limitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 54.
345. See 1979 Statute f Limitations Hearing, supra note 227 at 1. See also Pub. L. No. 95-103, 91
Stat. 842 (1977); S. REP. No. 569, supra note 310, at 1-2.
346. S. REP. No. 569, supra note 310, at 2-3.
347. 1979 Statute ofLimitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 79, 180.
348. S. REP. No. 569, supra note 310, at 5. See also 1979 Statute qfLimitations Hearing, supra note
227, at 13.
349. There were 2,600 additional claims in South Dakota alone, where BIA employees had
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organizations nevertheless described the investigation as a
"whitewash," complaining that subcontracts had been made only
at their own initiative and for insubstantial time and funds. "[I1n
my own private practice I would be ashamed to recommend action
to a client on the basis of the kind of investigation that we were
forced to do," the lawyer who had supervised California Indian
Legal Services' subcontract told Congress.
350
Potential suits involved a great variety of issues including
boundary disputes, trespass on open land, unauthorized logging,
unlawful withdrawals of reservation water, impairment of fishing
rights and fish stocks, and state tax foreclosures on tax-exempt
Indian lands. 35 ' The true extent of the problem could not be known
precisely, however, because federal land transaction records were
scattered, incomplete, and erroneous; many apparently had been
destroyed in a computer purge. 52 Administrative action on
identified claims drew further criticism. Within months of the filing
deadline, Interior and Justice settled or rejected 2,700 claims.
3 53
"They are not digging them up; they are burying them," argued
legal services attorney Bruce Friedman.
354
Tribes and the Administration do agree on the advisability of
further extending the filing deadline, arguing that haste results in
overlooking meritorious cases, rushing weak or poorly researched
cases to court to the injury of Indian and non-Indian parties alike,
and obviating attempts at settlement. 35 5 Congress, however, has
begun to fear the fiscal consequences of further research. "It seems
that the more time that expires the more cases seem to surface,"
Senator Cohen complained at recent hearings, describing the 1980
deadline as "written in concrete. "356 Despite growing sentiment
that the number of reported claims has been inflated to justify
greater appropriations, there remains the probability that federal
mismanagement of Indian lands has permitted widespread and
incompletely disclosed trespass and injury in past years. To the
extent that fault can be traced to federal administrators, no
reported only 26. See S. REp. No. 569, supra note 310, at 3; 1979 Statute qfLimitations Hearing, supra
note 227, at 110-11,220.
350. 1979 Statute qfLimitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 85-88, 94-95, 100-01, 104, 182, 220.
South Dakota Senator.lames Abourezk, later to serve as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs, unsuccessfully sought legislation to create a special, independent federal agency to
represent tribes in trusteeship matters. See Hearings on Indian Trust Counsel Authority, Before the Subcomm.
on Indian Affairs qf the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
351. See 1979 Statute qf Limitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 18-25.
352. See 1979 Statute sfLimitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 95, 103, 126-27, 175, 180-81, 183.
353. S. REp. No. 569, supra note 310, at 3. See 1979 Statute on Limitations Hearing, supra note 227,
at 5.
354. 1979 Statute of Limitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 184.
355. S. REP. No. 569, supra note 310, at 5. See 1979 Statute of Limitations Hearin's, supra note 227,
at 6, 10, 20, 30-31, 43, 63, 69.
356. 1979 Statute qfLimitations Hearing, supra note 227, at 11.
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legislative deadline on trusteeship actions is likely to achieve
closure. Liability merely will shift from private parties to the
United States.
VII. THE LAND ALTERNATIVE
I prefer a land base instead of money. Look what has
happened to other tribes-used car lots, liquor, and
foolish spending took all of the money. Soon it was all
gone. We need something that will keep for the future, a
place to anchor and hold fast.
357
Since 1970 the United States has reconveyed more than
500,000 acres of public domain to tribes in the western states.
358
These transfers were made overtly for socioeconomic purposes and
not to resolve particular tribal land claims, although "[i]n most
instances . . . the legislation containfed] a provision that
allow[ed] the Indian Claims Commission to determine whether
there should be an offset of the value of the land against any claims
that the Indians in question might have pending against the United
States." 359 "We view the question of whether Indian tribes are to
be given money payment or their land returned is one that will have
to be decided on the merits of each case," Interior Secretary Hickel
told Congress in 1970.360 Reconveyed lands have included tracts
357. Hearing: Establishment of a Siletz Indian Reservation, Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1980) (remarks of Stanley Strong, Siletz elder) [hereinafter cited as
1980 Siletz Hearingj.
358. Act of August 2, 1956, 70 Stat. 941 (Jemez and Zia Pueblos); Act of.july 20, 1956, 70 Stat.
581 (Florida Seminole); Act of August 13, 1949, 63 Stat. 604 (Pueblos and Canoncito Navajo); Pub.
L. No. 95-398, 92 Stat. 850 (1978) (Lake Traverse, Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux); Pub. L. No. 95-337,
92 Stat. 455 (1978) (Fallon Paiute); Pub. L. No. 95-329, 92 Stat. 412 (1978) (Creek Nation); Pub. L.
No. 95-327, 92 Stat. 407 (1978) (Cheyenne-Arapaho of Oklahoma); Pub. L. No. 95-280, 92 Stat.
244 (1978) (Zuni); Pub. L. No. 95-191, 91 Stat. 1406 (1977) (Ely Indian Colony); Pub. L. No. 95-
133, 91 Stat. 1158 (1977) (Te-Moak Western Shoshone); Pub. L. No- 94-115, 89 Stat. 580 (1975)
(Laguna Pueblo); Pub. L. No. 94-114, 89 Stat. 577 (1975) (submarginal lands on 17 reservations);
Pub. L. No. 93-591, 88 Stat. 1922 (1975) (Citizen Potawatomi); Pub. L. No. 93-590, 88 Stat. 1922
(1975) (Absentee Shawnee); Pub. L. No. 93-588, 88 Stat. 1920 (1975) (Miami); Pub. L. No. 93-582,
88 Stat. 1915 (1975) (Cheyenne-Arapaho of Oklahoma); Pub. L. No. 93-560, 88 Stat. 1820 (1974)
(Hualapai); Pub. L. No. 93-530, 88 Stat. 1711 (1974) (San Carlos Apache); Pub. L. No. 93-493, 88
Stat. 1486 (1974) (Navajo); Pub. L. No. 93-489, 88 Stat. 1465 (1974) (Lake Traverse, Sisseton-
Wahpeton Sioux); Pub. L. No. 93-458, 88 Stat. 1383 (1974) (Kootenai); Pub. L. No. 93-451, 88
Stat. 1368 (1974) (Mono); Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (1974) (Cocopah); Pub. L. No. 93-285,
88 Stat. 142 (1974) (Rocky Boy's); Pub. L. No. 92-488, 86 Stat. 806 (1972) (Burns Paiute); Pub. L.
No. 92-441, 86 Stat. 743 (1972) (Lac du Flambeau); Pub. L. No. 92-435, 86 Stat. 733 (1972) (Fort
Belknap); Pub. L. No. 92-427, 86 Stat. 719 (1972) (Warm Springs); Pub. L. No. 92-186, 85 Stat.
643 (1971) (Summit Lake Paiute); Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (1971) (Taos Pueblo); Pub% L.
No. 91-471, 84 Stat. 1039 (1970) (Yankton Sioux); Pub. L. No. 91-362, 84 Stat. 687 (1970)
(Washoe).
359. S. REP. No. 967, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (certain federally owned lands within the
White Earth Reservation are held in trust by the United States for the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe);
S. REP. No. 538, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971) (declaring that certain federally owned lands in the
State of Nevada are held in trust by the United States for the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony).
360. S. REP. No. 1345, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONe. & Au. NEws
4954 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 13451.
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previously managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian
Health Service, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of
Reclamation, and Forest Service, and surplus as well as
commercially managed tracts.
361
Although several earlier laws had reconveyed public domain
to tribes, 362 the 1971 restoration of Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo
generally has been regarded as an historic watershed. Without
doubt, it cast congressional misgivings over land transfers in
unusually bold relief. The Senate initially opposed the return of
Blue Lake, reasoning as follows:
It would be literally impossible to try to satisfy Indian
claims by transferring land in lieu of a cash payment.
Further, such action would be in conflict with past policy
and the provisions of the Indian Claims Commission Act.
It ... would set a dangerous precedent and would be the
basis for claims to land by many tribes; and . . . these
claims should not be satisfied by invasion upon the public
estate. . . . A formal grant of national forest or other
public lands to one Indian tribe will clearly stand as an
example for others to seek to follow, regardless of the
language in legislative proceedings intended to limit the
scope of an action.
363
To overcome legislative resistance, tribal leaders were forced
to argue that traditional ceremonial use of the Lake made their case
"unique and singular." "[In no other Indian tribe that I know of
would you have a similar case of religious purposes," Taos
Governor Bernal assured the Senate. 364 "We are worried about the
land mass of the United States being stripped away," Montana
Senator Metcalf retorted, and he further stated the following:
361. S. REP. No. 538, supra note 359; H. R. REP. No. 1305, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
(Yardeka School land to be held in trust for the Creek Nation of Oklahoma); H. R. REP. No. 1306,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (lands held in trust for Cheyenne-Arapaho tribes of Oklahoma); H. R.
REP. No. 1298, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (lands held in trust for the Paiute and Shoshone Tribes
of the Fallon Indian Reservation and colony); H. R. REP. No. 624, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
(lands held in trust for the Te-Moak bands of Western Shoshone Indians); S. REP. No. 417, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Fallon Pauite and Shoshone land transfer); H. R. REP. No. 1339, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (federal surplus land on 15 reservations); S. REP. No. 975, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972) (acquisition of village cite for Yavapai-Apache Indians); H. R. REP. No. 1266, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (United States' lands held in trust for benefit of Confederated tribes of the
Warm Springs Reservation); S. REP. No. 1284, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (lands held in trust for
Yankton Sioux Tribe); S. REP. No. 1337, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (lands held in trust for Makah
Indian Tribe); S. REP. No. 786 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (land held in trust for the Lac du
Flambeau Bank of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians); S. REP. No. 859, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
(lands conveyed to Inter-Tribal Council, Inc., Miami, Okla.).
362. See supra note 360.
363. S. REP. No. 1345, 9 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1970).
364. Id. at 127.
INDIAN LAND CLAIMS 75
If this is a special situation and this Congress decides it is
a special situation, I want it written down [so] that my
own friend, a very old person in the Blackfeet Tribe, isn't
going to have an opportunity to go into Glacier Park and
get a mountain, or the Sioux, the Crows or the
Cheyennes are not going to have an opportunity to go
down into Yellowstone Park. I love the Crows and the
Cheyennes. But they are not going to go down into
Yellowstone Park and get a sacred mountain.
365
It is ironic in view of the extent of reservation poverty that
Congress has been reluctant to restore tribes' resource base,,
preferring on the whole to perpetuate transfer payments at federal
expense. The United States owns one-third or more of eleven
western states with large tribal populations, and 32.6 percent of all
land nationwide. 366 The cumulative acquisition and management
365. Id. at 129. Strengthening the Pueblo's claim to special treatment on religious freedom
grounds, Governor Bernal dismissed the possibility of commercial development in a colloquoy with
Quentin Burdick of North Dakota:
Senator BURDICK. Suppose some large livestock company would like to rent the
land for pasturage and offered the tribe some money for the pasturage. Would you use
it for pasturage? That is an economic use.
Mr. BERNAL. This is economic use and I will answer that question in this fashion:
Taos Pueblo Indians are using this land for drinking purposes, for health purposes,
religious purposes. We don't want no stock. We don't want no cattle raising. We did
not want it for economic benefit, sir.
Senator BURDICK. In other words, you are not going to use this for grazing, for
mining, for recreation, or for any reason other than religious purposes?
Mr. BERNAL. No, sir.
Senator BURDICK. I will ask the question once more. Sometime in the years ahead if
this land was used for grazing or used for mining, or used for recreation, would you
then willingly give this land back to the United States?
Mr. BERNAL. No, sir.
Senator BURDICK. You would not?
Mr. BERNAL. No, sir.
Senator BURDICK. Why?
Mr. BERNAL. Because we don't believe in economic development.
Id. at 131.
366. See 1978 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 237, table 382 (Dep't. of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census) [hereinafter cited as 1978 STATISTICAL ABSTRACTI. Federal land
ownerships by state is as follows: Arizona (44%); California (46%); Colorado (36%); Idaho (64%);
Montana (30%); Nevada (88%); New Mexico (34%); Oregon (52%); Washington (29%);
Wyoming (49%); Alaska (90% of the lands remain under federal management pending resolution of
ANCSA and national interest lands issues). Of the nationwide federal estate, 92.1% is "original
public domain" (lands never part of any state), and the balance constitutes lands repurchased
pursuant to article I, section 8, clause 17, of the United States Constitution. Id. See U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 8, cl. 17.
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cost of this estate is only about $10.60 per acre and its annual
income a little more than $4 per acre, chiefly (89.4 percent) from
the lease or sale of minerals. 367 Only 12.9 percent of the federal
estate is committed to specific governmental objectives, such as
federal installations, military bases, national park and wildlife
areas, irrigation and flood control. The balance is held for
commercial leasing and limited public access as national forest and
grazing lands. 368 The total historic federal investment in these
lands, a little more than $3,000,000,000, is less than the annual
federal contribution to Indian administration and reservation
transfer payments.
369
Under these facts it would seem that as a strategy for
reservation economic growth, reconveyance of idle public domain
would be far less costly than federal financial and administrative
assistance. Congress recently recognized this in fashioning
legislation to restore the Siletz tribe of Oregon to self-government.
"Termination" of that tribe in 1954 resulted in severe economic
hardship, landlessness, and social disorganization. After renewing
federal recognition and services in 1977,370 Congress turned its
attention to the establishment of a new reservation to replace the
1,100,000 acres originally controlled by the Siletz people.
A plan agreed to by the State, Administration, and tribe would
give Siletz thirty-seven scattered parcels of BLM woodlands
containing 3,600 acres, together with a thirty-six acre tract in the
City of Siletz on the site of the former Indian agency. 3 71 Valued at
$3,000,000 by the United States, the area to be reconveyed would
generate an estimated $600,000 annual income for tribal services
and operations from logging. Because the restored "reser-
vation" consists of small, nonadjacent parcels, all parties agreed to
state jurisdiction. In lieu of state taxes the tribe, like the
United States before it, would pay a fee for services computed from
land revenues. This arrangement cannot be criticized as generous
and would not be acceptable, in all likelihood, to tribes concerned
with asserting territorial sovereignty. Nonetheless, it represents
significant realization that land transfers are less costly and more
effective as a response to past inequities and present poverty than
cash payments.
Regrettably, land restoration proposals continue to be met
367. 1978 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 366, at 237-38, tables 382 & 385.
368. 1978 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 366, at 238, table 383.
369. 1978 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 366, at 238. See supra note 9. See also Barsh, The
B.IA. Reorganization Follies of1978: A Lesson in Bureaucratic Self-Defense. 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1979).
370. Pub. L. No. 95-195, 91 Stat. 1415 (1977).
371. 1980 Siletz Hearing, supra note 357, at 2, 8, 9-11, 14-18, 37, 44, 54-55, 91, 97-98.
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with resistance from local and federal interest groups. Federal land
management agencies naturally differ in their candid evaluation of
tribal land demands. Land restoration augments the Bureau of
Indian Affairs' administrative domain at the expense of sister
agencies such as the Bureau of Reclamation and Forest Service.
The Forest Service has been a vocal opponent of legislation
extending tribal boundaries into adjacent national forests. 372 Non-
Indian local governments frequently view strengthening of
neighboring reservations as a political and economic threat,
although their objections typically are framed in terms of what is
supposed to be good for Indians. South Carolinians opposing
Catawba land claims argued that as a result of termination and
landlessness "[t]hey are no longer an entity, which is good. They
have been absorbed into the mainstream of life." ' 37 3 "In terms of
keeping the reservation alive," Utah Congressman Dan Marriott
remarked at House hearings last year, "has the time come maybe
to depart from that program, to mainstream Indians into the cities
and towns and give them the financial dollars that they ought to
have and maybe move away from the maintenance of
reservations? ' 37 4 When advocating dispersal and assimilation of
tribes, self-styled idealists and friends of the Indians rarely seem to
consider the essential role of freedom of choice in a democracy.
Federal transfer payments are not controversial; hence they
are politically more attractive than land restoration. As one South
Carolina legislator explained in support of cash settlements,
"[w]hatever is put into [the tribe] will be of definite economic
benefit to the entire region. It is like an economic development
approach. "35 Quantitative studies of reservation spending
patterns suggest that one dollar of federal financial aid to a tribe has
several dollars' effect on neighboring off-reservation com-
munities. 37 6 Lacking investment opportunities or sources of supply
at home because of underdevelopment and federal "protective"
regulation, tribes and their citizens tend to expend most of their
income on goods and services from outside sources. A cash
settlement with a tribe, then, amounts to a substantial indirect
transfer payment to regional non-tribal businesses, but relatively
little reservation capital formation.
372. H. R. REP. No. 1266, supra note 361, at 4, 9.
373. See Hearin.' on the Settlement qfthe Catawba Indian Land Claims, Before the House Comm. on Interior
and InsularAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1979).
374. Id. at 34.
375. Id. at 14.
376. See Kent &.Johnson, Flows qf Funds on the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation, in NINTH DISTRICT
FED. BANK INFORMATION SERIES (1976); Barsh, The Economics of a Traditional Coastal Indian
Salmon Fishery (unpublished report).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the compensation awarded tribes for lands lost
by confiscation or unjust dealing has been inadequate, both in
replacing the property lost and in meeting tribes' current economic
needs. The cost of litigation, whether for judgment or as a prelude
to legislative settlement, and the degree of federal control of the use
and distribution of cash payments rendered past policies even less
beneficial to tribes. Settlements perceived as inequitable by tribal
claimants, especially settlements for cash alone, fail to achieve
closure. Instead, they increase tribes' cohesion and their resolve to
press for further relief. The accumulation of past inequities
continues to haunt efforts at resolving future disputes justly because
legislators fear reopening old claims by fairly treating new ones.
Indian claims settlement policy in the United States has not
materially improved Indians' socioeconomic status, has resulted in
deteriorating federal-tribal relationships, and has created a
motivation for perpetuating poverty and inequity. Too much
concern for the federal pocketbook has made proceedings over the
past eighty years largely an exercise in futility for tribes and the
United States alike.
Most tribes' objective in prosecuting land claims was not to
liquidate the value of tribal membership in anticipation of
termination, as past Congresses have supposed, but to rebuild the
capabilities of economies shattered by the loss 'of subsistence
resources. Federal public domain lands offer a source of
reconstruction capital more suited to tribes' economic preferences
than financial capital, and a source that requires considerably less
current expense to taxpayers. If successful in restoring a measure of
tribal self-sufficiency, moreover, land restoration would obviate
much of the present substantial cost of Indian administration, a
goal that past claims settlement policies have proved incapable of
achieving. It remains to be seen whether future Congresses will
have the courage to change course at the risk of necessitating
renegotiation of past settlements - and whether the other English-
speaking federal republics, faced now themselves with the
territorial claims of native peoples, will have the wisdom to benefit
from the United States' mistakes.
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APPENDIX 1
SUMMARY OF TRIBAL LAND CLAIMS LITIGATION




DISMISSED amount amount ALL CASES
Number ofdockets 103 15 17 135
Number of tribes 35 15 17 67
AMOUNTCLAIMED $1,412,749,5101 $303,704,146 - $1,716,453,656
AMOUNT AWARDED - 32,970,7682 $20,367,4571 53,388,225
OFFSETS DEDUCTED - 16,159,173 2,830,730 18,989,903
NET PAYMENT - 20,127,2284 17,536,268 37,663,496
'Twelve of these dockets involved claims for unspecified dollar amounts.2
0f this award, 72% was principal, and the balance interest from the time of the taking of the
land.
,Of this award, 76% was principal, and the balance interest.
4
1n two dockets, offsets exceeded the award and recovery was zero.
Source: Heanngs, Creation of Indian Claims Commssion, House Committee on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 1 st
Sess. 163-66 (1945).
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Current Dollars 1978 Dollars Percent of
(millions) (millions) Total Awards




Other costs to tribes' 9.8 16.0 1.39
Net available to tribes 627.9 1,024.8 88.75
I.C.C. expenses4 15.7 32.4 2.22
D.O.J. defense costs5  9.5 16.0 1.34
GAO/GSA accounting6 8.9 16.4 1.26
B.I.A. enrollment
7
COSTS BORNE BY U.S. 34.1 64.8 4.82
TOTAL COSTS 113.7 194.6 16.07
'1978 INDIAN CLAIMS COMM. ANNUAL REP. app. 1.
'Computed as 9.86% of total awards based on a sample of 21 awards for which complete cost
data were available; see supra note 100, in text of article, for citations.
'Legal expenses, expert witnesses, and planning, calculated as 0.8%, 0.38%, and 0.21% of
total awards based on a sample of21 awards for which complete cost data were available.
'Salaries and expenses of commissioners and commission staff. Department of the Treasury,
Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States Government
(1946-1978).5
Personal communication, Richard Beale, Indian Claims, Department of Justice, that an
average of 18 attorneys at GS 14 and 15 pay levels were employed by his branch. See Schedule of
Permanent Positions in Otiice of Management and Budget, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT app. (1946-1978).
'Number of personnel assigned to Indian Claims accounting was projected from 1976
Appropriations Hearings, supra note 59, at 74, 77-78; 1975 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 59, at 6-7,
21-22; Schedule of Permanent Positions in Office of Management and Budget, BUDGET OP THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
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'Not reliably estimate. Enrollment costs rarely have been reported. The BIA asked Congress
for $15,000 to prepare a roll for theTlingit and Haida, S. REP. No. 848, supra note 100, at 6, $55,000
to prepare rolls for the Weas, Peorias and other Ohio Valley tribes, S. REP. No. 870, supra note 141,
at 3-4, and $468,000 to cover an increased volume of work associated with recent large judgment
awards in 1979. See Hearings, Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Fiscal Year 1980,
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., I st Sess. 1927-28 (1979). The total enrollment cost under
ICC proceedings probably has not exceeded $5,000,000. Constant dollars computed by adjusting
each annual cost or payment by the ratio of that year's Consumer Price Index to the Consumer Price
Index for 1978. 1978 STATISTICAL ABSTRCT OF THE UNITED STATES 474 (1980) (Dep't of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census).
APPENDIX 3
JUDGMENT DISTRIBUTIONS PRIOR TO THE 1973
DISTRIBUTION OFJUDGMENT FUNDS ACT (1960-1972)
Fund To




Both' Taxes Debts SSA Cost
1960-1964i 6 1 7 2 1 6
1965-1969 10 2 34 15 7
1970-1972 5 9 114 25 2 13
1973-19801 2 1 1
1960-1980 23 11 15 48 2 4 26
Source: 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 565, 571, 581, 590a, 594, 609, 647, 658, 659, 676a, 690, 788a, 881,
882, 883, 911, 961, 967a, 991, 1011, 1031, 1051, 1071, 1072, 1081, 1101, 1111, 1122, 1131, 1141,
1151, 1161, 1171, 1181, 1191, 1201, 1211, 1221, 1231, 1241, 1251, 1261, 1271, 1281, 1291, 1300,
1300b, 1300c, 1300d, 1300e (West 1963 & Supp. 1980).
' All distributions 1960-1972 were made by special act of Congress. Three distributions prior to
1960 were made by act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 571, 658, 911 (West 1963), and 14 by the Interior
Department without any special authorizing legislation. Including pre-ICC awards,
approximately $60,000,000 has been distributed by bare administrative action, $370 under special
individualized legislation, and $315 in accordance with the 1973 Distribution of.Judgment Funds
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-134.
'Special arts of Congress passed after adoption of Pub. L. No. 93-134, when administrative
distribution under that law had failed.
'Except as indicated, programed funds were authorized to be used for any purpose requested by
the tribe and approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
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APPENDIX 5















Profit Subsidy Loss Per
Margin4 Ratio5 Shareholder
1 $ 561 $ 298.34 19.81 .04 .37 .68 $ 174.19
2 15,868 1,039.73 3.05 .09 .12 .85 101.16
3 18,006 2,975.29 3.46 .41 .20 .29 92.74
4 11,338 1,807.99 .32 2.53 .11 .40 924.15
5 29,075 2,203.17 2.66 .33 .59 .87 350.75
6 10,119 1,916.41 1.24 .85 .01 .36 21.59
7 7,487 1,977.98 1.13 1.10 .40 .30 500.16
8 875 98.23 4.64 - .17 .91 48.09
9 2,588 356.90 1.06 .10 .06 .46 66.77
TOTAL $73,242 $1,078.89 .56 $120.20
AVERAGE
7  $1,006.45 4.15 .61 .57 $52.50
Source: Fiscal year 1978 corporate annual reports. These reports are not public, and consent to
their use was conditioned on anonymity. These nine regional corporations represent roughly three-
fourths of all native shareholders. Italicized figures are negative values.
'Tangible assets less current liabilities (liquidation value).
'Ratio of current assets to current liabilities (ability to meet current obligations).
'Ratio of long-term debt to paid-in or equity capital (leverage).
*Ratio of net operating profit (revenues less expenses) to expenses, before taxes.
'Ratio of paid-in subsidies under ANCSA to total assets.6
Column sum or weighted average.
7Unweighted average.
APPENDIX 6
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUES, NINE
ALASKA NATIVE REGIONAL CORPORATIONS 1978




+ Fishing Mining 7(i)
1 63.2 15.7 3.7 7.3
2 7.3 1.8 90.5
3 6.8 41.6 30.5 12.7
4 .6 6.1 82.0 6.5
5 7.5 13.2 29.0 6.8 37.7
6 .3 .1 15.7 .2 81.5 .4
7 60.9 12.3 13.9 4.4
8 19.4 4.1 .3 25.6 50.4
9 2.2 14.3 23.2 52.4 .1
TOTAL 5  9.4 2.5 11.9 8.2 26.2 33.6 2.5 1.6
Source: Fiscal year 1978 corporate annual reports. These reports are not public, and consent to
their use was conditioned on anonymity. These nine regional corporations represent roughly three-
fburths of all Native shareholders.
'Includes interest, dividends, and resale of securities or other equity.
21ncludes operation of pipeline camps, mining camps, and hotel-related services such as
restaurants.
'Includes security, technical and profesional services, management.
*Includes building, land development for resale, and building materials.5
Weighted average.
